

Conflict and

John Burton

Burton's early career as an Australian diplomat representing a middle-sized, non-European power with little coercive potential made him intensely sceptical about 'realist' theorizing and underpinned many of his innovative ideas about coping with conflicts. In these very early extracts from his extensive work, he first introduces the distinction between disputes and deep-rooted conflicts, arguing for resolution rather than compromise settlements, and promotes the advantages of conflict prevention as a strategy for avoiding many destructive conflicts.

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Resolution of conflict is a process that comes from the decision-making of the parties. It involves a reappraisal of values and alternatives and costs, and the appropriate international institution is one that facilitates this process. It is critical also of traditional diplomatic practices. International studies have tended to be conducted separately from contemporary diplomatic practice, and, on the other hand, the practice of diplomacy has been little influenced by research. No such watertight compartments are now possible. Diplomacy is becoming as much exposed to scientific scrutiny as is any branch of social policy, despite traditions of secrecy that are maintained. In conditions of controlled communication, in which scholars have opportunities to pose questions that seem significant to them on the basis of their theories, in which parties are endeavouring to explain their behaviour, relevant influences are revealed.

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The main differences in function of the third party arise out of the difference in objective. Traditional mediation seeks agreements by compromises, or by persuading the parties that their best interests would be served by ceasing violence and arriving at a settlement. It is a negotiating framework. Controlled communication, on the other hand, endeavours to establish a condition in which the parties see their relationships as posing a problem to be solved. Both sides are assumed to have been acting in ways which appear to them, in the light of the knowledge they have, and the circumstances in which they operate, to be in their best interests. Neither is more right nor wrong than the other. Even if an aggressive initiative has been wholly with one side, even if there appears to have been a blatant case of unprovoked aggression, there is still a problem: the apparent aggression was stimulated by some circumstances, and it is in

the interest of the suffering party to help solve the problem. The role of the third party is to establish a condition in which all the parties join with it in defining, identifying and solving the problem.

... Abstract models help parties to observe the basis of conflict, and in particular to discern the processes and effects of escalation. Their own accusations and counter-accusations about atrocities and provocations come to be perceived within this framework of behavioural responses and escalation processes, thus making possible a less subjective interpretation of events. Once the past is re-perceived and the violence explained, the future can be considered within a less fearful framework. The effect on the parties of an awareness of the processes of perception is a striking feature of this controlled communication. In short, the parties are helped not by the third party as such, but by the ordinary academic tools of analysis, to stand back from their conflict, and to understand its origins and its manifestations. Once each party is in a position to perceive the problem from a behavioural point of view of the other, communication is effectively controlled, and tends to become constructive.

... Parties to a conflict have most rigid ideas about the character and motives of their opponents. They have usually experienced many years of conflict and their selections from past history and their moral judgements justify, confirm and reinforce their attitudes. To a third party their images of their opponents appear distorted; no man could so consistently be irrational, immoral and untrustworthy as one party is perceived to be by the other. That there is distortion is even clearer when it is discovered that each party has the same favourable image of itself and its behaviour, and the same unfavourable and treacherous one of the other. The initial problem is to demonstrate that these mirror images exist, that each party is making identical accusations about the other on the same kind of evidence. If the third party argues the case of one party, or in any way tries to demonstrate that an image or an interpretation of events is false, he prejudices his relationships with that party. Both sides must find out for themselves that their perceptions and interpretations may be false.

Demonstrations of the possibility of false visual perceptions help to make the point, without in any way requiring the third party to enter into the debate.

... Figure 1 may be interpreted as a very old lady or as a young girl. One set of political events and behavioural patterns can be interpreted as aggressive, or in some other way, according to the processes of perception that take place within the observer. In this case the observer can flash from one interpretation to another. What needs to be demonstrated is that all observation is preconditioned by experience - and by prejudice.

... In these ways parties to a conflict can be persuaded that the assumptions they make about the behaviour of others are a consequence of their experiences, which are based upon perceptions, which themselves are conditioned by their attitudes and expectations in the environment in which they are observing and making judgements. The processes that lead to reinforcement and certainty can by these means be explained, at least




Figure 1 Which is it – an old woman with chin sunk in wrap, or the heroine of an early twentieth-century romantic novel, her chin in air?

sufficiently to suggest that all evidence must be tested by some means to ensure that it is being correctly interpreted.
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Conflict Avoidance

So far we have been concerned with the use of controlled communication in the analysis and resolution of conflict, and in continuation of this, the promotion of functional cooperation between parties. It is in the context of resolving conflict that the technique is most clearly defined, and in which it can be compared with traditional means of peaceful settlement of disputes.

Conflict avoidance is a far more challenging objective because it involves prediction – prediction of likely conflicts, and prediction of future conditions in which they will

take place. It could be argued that conflict avoidance is already an important objective of the day-to-day decision-making of administrations, and of the art of diplomacy generally. It could also be claimed to be one of the longer-term objectives of many international institutions, such as the Economic and Social Council and its associated agencies. It is the ultimate end of research institutions that seek to trace the sources of conflicts and to understand their nature. However, no government, international institution or research organisation has developed techniques designed to anticipate and to avoid particular international conflicts. Traditional means of peaceful settlement of disputes are relevant to particular problems after they have arisen, and to events leading up to them. It is difficult to envisage any circumstances in which they could be employed to anticipate and to avoid possible future conflicts among states and nations.

Conflict avoidance is of two different kinds. One is in respect of likely or anticipated conflicts - those that reasonably can be anticipated because of some observed changes that will in the future alter local relationships, as when the influence of a great power declines in a particular region. The other is in respect of the maintenance of peaceful relationships among states that are already in a close working relationship and do not anticipate the development of tensions. Controlled communication, with its emphasis upon analysis by parties of their own relationships, upon the perceptions that parties have of each other and alternatives available in adjusting to perceived conditions, is as applicable to the peaceful relationships of states as to relationships among states that are, or are likely to be, in conflict. It can be employed, therefore, not only in conflict resolution and in the avoidance of conflicts that can reasonably be anticipated if no steps are taken to avoid them, but also in the maintenance of peaceful relationships even when no source of conflict is currently suspected. It can have a prophylactic as well as a therapeutic function. As such it lends itself to institutionalised forms of regional and international organisation designed to promote peaceful relations and to deal with conflicts if they should arise.

To a limited degree the informal meetings of the British Commonwealth of Nations were an institution that fulfilled these combined functions. In many respects it was a controlled communication exercise in which tensions between members could be brought to the surface in the presence of other members who in some instances could act as a third party. No agenda, no minutes, no publicity, secret discussions and conditions conducive to free expression of attitudes, opportunities to alter attitudes and perceptions, and the absence of bargaining or negotiation were all features of the Prime Ministers' meetings. They lacked the insights and knowledge now available to specialists in the field of world politics, and increased numbers, less informality and a greater number of issues to be handled in the short time available for meetings have helped to destroy their effectiveness.

Whether employed for conflict resolution or conflict avoidance, controlled communication takes the same basic form. It is the parties that are required to project into the future, to define the problems that might occur, to check perceptions and assumptions, to examine their own internal conditions that could spill over into wider conflict, and finally to examine alternative means by which, through functional cooperation or otherwise, possible conflicts might be avoided. The third party has the role of injecting new

information about possible trends in world society, the environment in which states will be responding, the changes that are likely to take place in values within the states concerned because of similar changes taking place elsewhere, changing industrial structures and the way in which these will alter international relations generally, and other relevant environmental conditions. In particular, the third party has the function of bringing to attention domestic problems that governments sometimes find more convenient not to consider, and not to admit exist.

The role of the third party in conflict avoidance is more active than in conflict resolution. It is only a third party that can take initiatives to determine parties and issues in relation to possible future conditions of conflict. Governments do not look many years ahead, and they are not likely to take initiatives in researching into or in solving future problems. This is the role of those studying problems of conflict, aware of theorising in this area, examining profiles of states that have and have not been engaged in conflicts, familiar with longer-term trends in world society, and prepared to predict continuation of some of these, and who can with some degree of credibility point to possible future sources of conflict and argue which policies should be avoided or should be encouraged if a condition of peaceful relations is to be maintained. This is a role traditionally filled by academics; it is one that could now be filled by recruited members of foreign offices and international institutions, thus including a 'third party' within decision making at national and international levels.


Conflict Theory and Practice

Johan Galtung

It is quite impossible to do justice to the influence that Johan Galtung has had – and continues to have – on the whole field of peace and conflict research since the 1950s. Starting with the establishment of PRIO (the Peace Research Institute Oslo) in the late 1950s and the founding of the *Journal of Peace Research* in 1964, moving through becoming the first Professor of Peace Studies at the University of Oslo in the 1970s and continuing through his many global professorial appointments thereafter, Galtung has been a theoretical and practical force in the study and application of ideas from conflict and peace research for many decades. His work for TRANSCEND (an online peace university) has enabled him to retain his intellectual independence; his practical work as a peacemaking and peacebuilding consultant has kept his work firmly based in the realities of intractable conflicts; and his extensive writings have challenged and stimulated several generations of students. The extracts here presented are, we hope, relatively unfamiliar but represent two sides of Galtung's work – the first a succinct statement about his key ideas regarding conflict formation and transformation and the second an example of the connection between his theoretical ideas and their use in generating real alternative solutions to real conflicts.

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Conflict Theory and Practice: A Perspective



A **conflict** has its own life cycle; almost like something organic. It appears, reaches an emotional, even violent climax, then tapers off, disappears – and often reappears. There is a logic: – individuals and groups (such as nations and states) have goals:

- goals may be incompatible, exclude each other, like two states wanting the same land, or two nations wanting the same state;
- when goals are incompatible a **contradiction**, an issue, is born;
- any actor/party with unrealized goals feels frustrated and more so the more basic the goal, like basic needs and basic interests;
- frustration **may** lead to aggression, turning inward as **attitudes** of hatred, or outward as **behavior** of verbal or physical **violence**;
- hatred and violence **may** be directed toward the holders of the goals standing in the way, but it is not always that “rational”;
- violence is intended to harm and hurt (including oneself), and **may** breed a spiral of counter-violence as defense and/or **revenge**;
- that spiral of hatred and violence becomes a meta-conflict (like meta-stasis relative to cancer), over the goals of preserving and destroying.

In this way, a conflict may almost get eternal life, vexing and waning, disappearing and reappearing. The original, root, conflict recedes into the background like when Cold War attention focused mostly on such means of destruction as nuclear missiles.

Conflicts may combine, in series or parallel, into complex conflict formations with many parties and many goals, because the same parties and/or the same goals are involved. The elementary conflict formation with **two** parties pursuing **one** goal is rare, except for pedagogical purposes, or as the polarized products of hatred and violence leading to simplified conflict formations. The normal conflict has **many** actors, **many** goals and **many** issues, is complex, not easily mapped, yet that mapping is essential.

Life-cycle of a conflict

The **life-cycle** of a conflict may be divided into three phases, before violence, during violence and after violence, separated by outbreak and cease-fire. This does not imply that violence is unavoidable, or that conflict = violence/destruction.

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The Middle East Conflict

Johan Galtung

Let us start with the beginning, literally speaking, with Genesis 15:18:

So that day Jehovah made this covenant with Abram: "I have given this land to your descendants from the Wadi-el-Arish to the river Euphrates. And I give to them these nations: Kenites, Kenizzites, Kadmonites, Hittites, Perizzites, Rephaim, Amorites, Canaanites, Girgashites, Jebusites."

And we continue, Genesis 17:5-14:

"What's more," God told him, "I am changing your name. It is no longer Abram ('Exalted Father'), but Abraham ('Father of Nations') - for that is what you will be. I have declared it. I will give you millions of descendants who will be from many nations. Kings shall be among your descendants! And I will continue this agreement between us generation after generation, forever, for it shall be between me and your children as well. It is a contract that I shall be your God and the God of your posterity. And I will give all this land of Canaan to you and them, forever. And I will be your God.

"Your part of the contract," God told him, "is to obey its terms. You personally and all your posterity have this continual responsibility: that every male among you shall be circumcised; the foreskin of his penis shall be cut off. This will be the proof that you and they accept this covenant. Every male shall be circumcised on the eighth day after birth. This applies to every foreign-born slave as well as to everyone born in your household. This is a permanent part of this contract, and it applies to all your posterity. All must be circumcised. Your bodies will thus be marked as participants in my everlasting covenant. Anyone who refuses these terms shall be cut off from his people; for he has violated my contract."

A strong statement, indeed. A metaphor with both Chosen People and Promised Land in it, a metaphor that has served as an archetype not only for Judaism but also for Christianity and Islam, in other words for the three semitic religions that together may be said to define the Occident. This First Covenant with Abraham is crystal clear, especially if we accept the interpretation of Wadi-el-Arish as the Nile.¹ And the First Covenant is then confirmed in the Second Covenant, with Moses on Mt. Sinai, set down in Exodus for everybody to read.²

A myth, some might say. And I would say it is the kind of raw material out of which history is made. The reality of this myth is proven by its tenacity, close to 4,000 years by now.

Let us then look at the other side. Professor Ismail Zayid of Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, writes in *The Guardian Weekly*:³

Zionist re-writing of the history of Palestine is not a novelty, but your correspondents compound falsification with absurdity. Credible historians, including Arnold Toynbee, assert that the Palestinian Arabs of today are the descendants of the cumulative stock of the Canaanites, Philistines, Jebusites

and others who inhabited Palestine, since the dawn of history and long before the Hebrews invaded the Land of Canaan (Palestine).

Professor Maxime Rodinson of the Sorbonne in Paris, and himself Jewish, states: "The Arab population of Palestine was native in all the senses of the word and their roots in Palestine can be traced back at least forty centuries." H. G. Wells wrote, sixty years ago: "If it is proper to 'reconstitute' a Jewish state (in Palestine), which has not existed for two thousand years, why not go back another thousand years and reconstitute the Canaanite state? The Canaanites, unlike the Jews, are still there."

The reader will notice that there is some overlap between the nations mentioned in that particular area of the world: the Canaanites, the Jebusites. And Philistines and Palestinians.

Is it possible to know such things? I do not think that is even the correct question, not knowing the correct answer. Even if it is a myth, this is the kind of raw material out of which history is made. Whether the evidence presented can stand up to tests of modern historiography may be less important. The important point is an intense feeling of belongingness, of *homeland*.

Four thousand years of human history. This is a long span of time, and if there is one thing I have learned myself by working for twenty-five years now, off and on, as a peace researcher on this extremely complicated and intractable conflict, it is the following: the roots of the solution, if there are any, are found in the future, not in the past. It is my experience that it is not in any way helpful to try to survey these 4,000 years in order to score points as to who did more injustice to whom, who lived longest, where, in the largest numbers, and so on. Rather, I will extract three simple axioms from the past, and let them guide my search for a possible solution in the future. After having done that, I will more or less say good-bye to the past, and invite everybody to share with me these visions, not so much different from visions many others might have, in the search for a viable future in the Middle-East.

Axiom 1: *The right to live in that area is an inalienable right both for Arabs and for Jews.* In other words, I take both justifications as quoted above not only as sufficient evidence for that inalienable right, but also as equal evidence. And that leads me immediately to

Axiom 2: *No viable peace can be obtained in the area except by according equal rights and duties to Arabs and Jews.* In other words, any solution based on concepts of "undivided Israel" or "undivided Palestine" to the exclusion of Arabs and Jews, respectively, is doomed in advance, even if the exclusion does not mean expulsion, leaving alone extermination, but any type of secondary citizenship. No security would ever be found within any such form. Whatever kind of peace in the sense of "absence of violence" that can be obtained will be of only short duration and at the expense of tremendous levels of repression, probably also exploitation, and in most cases direct violence or threats of direct violence. In other words, the peace spoken about is only absence of overt violence, it is not "peace" in any real sense, and certainly not security. To mix two metaphors: the peace of the cemetery, on top of a volcano. That is, until an impetuous (shaking off), like the present uprising in the occupied territories, shatters the illusion. To these axioms should then be added a third:

Axiom 3: *Axioms 1 and 2 do not pertain only to the structure of a peaceful and viable solution, but also to any process leading to a viable solution.* In other words, any peace process is doomed to fail unless the two parties, here only described as "Arabs" and "Jews" (in alphabetical order), are accorded equal rights and duties in the process. Stated more succinctly and with a very clear address to the Camp David "peace process" (that never was one according to axiom 3): accords arrived at over the heads of one of the parties concerned cannot be part of a viable peace process, and will hardly lead to any viable peace structure.⁴

At this point let me be more specific. Let it first be said that the area I am thinking of is not much different from the area described in Genesis 15:18, with the interpretation mentioned, but somewhat smaller. I am thinking particularly of mandated Palestine administered by Britain after the First World War, until it was divided (by Churchill) in 1922 into Cis-Jordania (roughly equal to the area today controlled by Israel) and Trans-Jordania (roughly equal to the area today controlled by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan).

In that area, what I refer to as the "Middle East conflicts" are a complex web of three conflicts: (1) between Jews and Arabs over state formation in Israel/Palestine (roughly speaking the same as Cis-Jordania); (2) the conflict between the Jewish state and surrounding Arab states; and (3) the conflict over who shall be the conflict manager for the region - the United States, the two superpowers in conjunction, the United Nations, all three, or "none of the above." To this could then be added a fourth conflict between superpowers and possibly also other outside powers with special interests in the area.

However, at the nucleus of this complex we find the conflict between Arabs and Jews over state formation, in other words the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians over Israel/Palestine. Even if conflicts nos. 2 and 3 were adequately solved to the satisfaction of all the parties involved, the solution would hardly be viable unless conflict no. 1 was also solved. From that it does not follow that if conflict no. 1 is solved, conflicts nos. 2 and 3 will be solved automatically. But it does not seem unreasonable to claim that there is more clearly a causal flow in that direction than from nos. 2 and 3 to no. 1. The uprising has brought out this point very clearly, and even if the Israelis should manage to dampen, even extinguish, these heavy manifestations of the underlying conflict, the Israelis will clearly be living on borrowed time. After a lull a new eruption, then a new lull, a new eruption, and so on and on.

And then, what? The Israelis used to have five options in the area: *status quo* with more or less local autonomy, annexation 1, annexation 2, expulsion, and Palestinian state formation. *Annexation 1* would mean inclusion of the occupied territories in Gaza and the West Bank, giving to the Palestinians status as first-class citizens (with the possible exception of ministerial ranks, access to classified defense information and defense production information, and such areas). *Annexation 2* would mean inclusion of the same territories, but giving to the Palestinians only some kind of secondary class citizenship (among other reasons because of the "demographic time bomb"), like living where they are but voting in Jordan. But with an ongoing *intifadah*, the *status quo* is untenable, hence annexation 2 seems to be out. And the spread of the Palestinian revolt to areas inside

the green line seems to indicate that annexation 1 is also out, and not only for demographic reasons.

What is left then would be "expulsion" and "Palestinian state formation." Roughly speaking these are the two options available but (so far) not articulated openly by the major Israeli parties, the Likud bloc and the Labor Party. What looks like efforts to maintain *status quo* barely conceals this incompatibility. If any actor in the area is a house divided against itself it must be Israel. And the rift seems to deepen with the growth of the orthodox parties.

The expulsion scenario would evict Palestinians to an area farther away from land they rightfully regard as theirs - the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank (and the Golan Heights) with a possible capital in East Jerusalem, and territory inside the green line. The scenario is tempting, of course, from an "undivided Israel" point of view because it would transform what today is an intra-state conflict into a set of inter-state conflicts that can be handled according to the conventional rules of the Westphalia "international system," with balance of power, strategic studies, occasional wars, and so on. But from a Palestinian point of view any such "solution" is totally unacceptable. All of this is totally incompatible with axioms 1 and 2 above; not to mention the international reaction.

The Palestinian state formation scenario would then be the only viable option of the four mentioned, but that in itself does not say very much in a solution-poor conflict. The question is what kind of state or states in the area, not only what kind of borders, and to explore that theme in more depth let me return to the axioms.

The options indicated by the extremists in the Middle-East, "undivided Israel" and "undivided Palestine," can serve the useful analytical purpose of identifying three other options, as indicated in Figure 1.

Option 1 is a 0-0 solution with neither the Arabs, nor the Jews, two nations, having any state in the area. Of course, this is what the Ottoman Empire was about, this is what the British Mandate was about, and today there are two clear successor possibilities




Figure 1 Solving the Middle East Conflict: Three Options

within this first option. One possibility is a border zone, or for that matter the whole area, put under clearly defined United Nations peace-keeping control, abrogating the right not only of the Palestinians but also of the Israelis to have a state with ultimate control of violence inside the territory and monopoly on foreign policy, including the exercise of violence outside. It is also possible to imagine that the present U.S.-Soviet detente might reach a high point in a shared willingness to control, jointly, the whole area as a superpower condominium. In other words, it is fairly clear what option 1 would mean in practice in the near future. But taken alone it is a clear nonstarter.

Option 2 is a 50-50 solution, which would mean that both parties have the right to a state in the area. In other words, back to a partition plan. There would be an Israeli state, and also a Palestinian state, giving to the Palestinian the same rights as those given to the Israelis of having a government, a parliament, a passport, and a flag. The Palestinian area would comprise all, or most, of the territories occupied in 1967, with a capital in East Jerusalem. In other words, "territories for peace" - as expressed repeatedly by the Arab side (Fez resolution 1987, Hussein-Arafat proposal 1985, Amman resolution 1987, and the agreement to give guarantees to all the states in the Middle East; culminating in the Algiers-Geneva-Stockholm resolutions late 1988). That 5 million Palestinians cannot make a living in that area is obvious. Nor can Israel house the total Jewish diaspora, but that is not an argument against the existence of Israel as a state with which Jews can identify.

It may certainly be objected that this solution was tried and failed in 1948. The Arab states around that central area attacked the newborn Israeli state. But before that the Jews had tried to seize as much of UN-allocated Arab Palestine as possible, including the massacre at Deir Yassin, 18 miles outside the borders allocated to a Jewish state before the British withdrawal (Plan Dalet). The argument could be that the same two scenarios might be enacted again.

Militarily, axiom 2 would, of course, rule out any effort to restrict forever the range of military weapons more severely in one of the states than in the other. Any such asymmetry is a way of communicating that one of the states is less trustworthy than the other. In other words, it is an asymmetric stigmatization, and unacceptable in any intense conflict for equal rights. If Israel does not like the idea of Palestine having any army at all, then the Palestinians might with equal justification say the same about Israel. If one of them is supposed to be disarmed, so also the other. If one of them is supposed to be transarmed, that is, possessing only means of defensive or nonprovocative defense, and no heavy weapons, so should the other. If one of them insists on a nuclear arsenal, so could the other. Again, the only viable lasting solution, including solution to the problem of security, is found in symmetry, and among those options defensive defense is by far the most stabilizing. However, detailed argumentation for this option lies outside the scope of this presentation. It should be noted that a Palestinian state would itself decide its relation to Jordan: open or latent enmity, coexistence, cooperation, confederation, federation, fusion. I do not see much basis for a prediction here, nor for knowing whether the last three possibilities would "Palestinize" Jordan or "Jordanize" Palestine.

Option 3 brings in a new element: the idea of transcending the conflict by bringing Arabs and Jews closer to each other (not Arabs and Arabs), on an equal basis, making

"undivided Palestine" and "undivided Israel" compatible. Of course, total compatibility in the sense of the classical nation-state (one nation, one state) is impossible with (at least) two nations inhabiting the area. But there are at least two good possibilities within option 3: option 3a and option 3b.

Option 3a would bring in an additional element: a confederation, based on cantons, some Arab, some Jewish, in the area roughly corresponding to Cis-Jordania, or, better still, the whole area encompassed by the original mandate. A Swiss model, in other words, with open borders permitting the flow of persons, goods, services, and information inside,⁵ but limiting, at least to start with, investment and settlement. If the Israelis could settle everywhere, they would be too strong economically and otherwise; if the Palestinians could settle everywhere, they would be too strong demographically (considering birth rates, and diaspora).

Since the confederation scenario is not often mentioned, let me be more specific. In such a scenario, there would be Arab cantons inside what today is known as Israel, for instance around Nazareth. There might also be Jewish cantons on the West Bank. In fact, one such canton might be exchanged for the other. Cantonization of all or parts of present Jordan (with at least 60% of the population being Palestinians) might be a part of the scenario. Cantons, and not necessarily only Palestinian, in present-day Sinai might be another part. Needless to say, all of this would depend on the ability of the actors in the area to convince each other and others that everybody would gain from a scheme of this kind. Jordan and Egypt might have to make some concessions.

Obviously, (all of) Jerusalem would be capital and federal territory, and the same principles would apply to Jerusalem as to the rest. The sum total of all the cantons would be known neither by the name of Israel nor by the name of Palestine, possibly by the two names hyphenated, possibly by a third name evocative of both or neither. There would certainly be a high level of internal government for the Arab cantons and for the Jewish cantons. But the sum total of Arab cantons would not be a Palestinian state in the sense defined above, nor would the sum total of Jewish cantons be identical with Israel of today or the successor state of Israel. But they would be sufficiently close for identification and cultural consistency. Palestinian law would apply in Arab cantons and Israeli law in Jewish cantons; disputes involving both would be settled by an overriding legal system. Neither would have a right to have an independent army. But the confederation as such might have an army for defense purposes, obviously with a defensive military doctrine.⁶

Option 3b is the image of the future often put forward by the Palestinian side, for instance by Al-Fatah: a secular state where Jews and Arabs (and Christians and others) live side by side. The area might roughly correspond to Cis-Jordania. In this vision there is an expression of the much higher ability of Moslems to accommodate Jews and Christians than vice versa. Islam has a concept of the religions of the *Kitab* (Old Testament); the other two exclude Islam with the concept of the Judeo-Christian faith. Catholic Spain (1492) evicted both Moslems and Jews; the Jews could settle for centuries in a number of Moslem countries (the "Oriental Jews") without being treated the way they were treated by Christians - Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox. Moreover, PLO was already an organization accommodating all three, together with secular Palestinians.

...