

Major-Minc. Power WAR # WARS of Retribution

A Major Power Makes High-Cost
Demands For Concessions

(The Threat To Sovereignty)

B Minc. Power Must Choose
WAR OR Bargain

1. Bargain May Cost
Sovereignty

2. WAR May Cost Defeat

C Minc. Power Chooses WAR

If Confident Population
Will Fight And Damage Will
Not Lead To Defeat

A Paradox:
I. Least-Likely WARS - WARS OF
Retribution; Major - Minor Power
WARS CHARS That Should Not
Occur

A. If Decision Makers Are
Rational And Minimally Informed
About Relative Power of Adversaries,
Minor Powers Should Never Go to WAR
Against Major Powers Cuz
Possibility of Defeat = UNACCEPTABLE
Damage - Thus they should always
Bargain

B. But, Paradoxically, Such WARS Are
Frequent In Comparison To Major Power
WARS

C. Such WARS Are Preceded By
Bargaining Offers From Major Powers
D. Such Bargains Seen To Eliminate
The Possibility of Such WARS

II. WARS OF Retribution:

Examples

A. 1500's - Dutch Against Spain

B. 1600's - Dutch Against France

C. 1700's - Prussia Against All

Major Powers, Except Britain

1756-63 Seven Years War (1756-63)

(Prussia Becomes A Major Power
Because of WAR)

D. American Revolution (1775-83)

E. Spain Against Napoleon
1808-12

F. Zulu Empire vs. Gt. Britain (1800's)

G. Boer WAR (1800's-90's) South

African Boer Republics vs Gt Britain

H. Finnish-Soviet WAR (1935-40)

I. Serbia vs A. Hungary (1914)

* Major Power (Cheese) WAR Before

It Gains Allies (Must Prove Commitment)

III. Explanatory Logic

A More Powerful Power Is Indifferent Between WAR And An Equal/C-Equivalent Bargain

1. Costs of WAR = Cost of Bargaining

2. Benefits Are Equal/Equivalent

3. This Means The More Powerful Needs An Extra (Selective) Incentive To Choose WAR OR Bargaining

4. More Powerful Will Choose WAR If More Powerful Fights

5. And Bargain If More Powerful Offers More (>) Than The

Baseline Bargain (Benefits Are

Greater Than WAR OR The

Equal-Equivalent Bargain

(Bargain Is Greater Than WAR)

III. B. - The Outcome of WAR
OR Peace Depends On
The Choice of the Major
Power - (Possible Loss of Sovereignty)
C. The Major Power will
Bargain If It Believes
It will Be Easily Defeated
D. But will Choose WAR,
If It Believes It Can
Resist And Inflict Significant
Damage On the Major Power.
E. This In Turn Is A
Function Of The Predicted
Domestic Support (Commitment)
For WAR! - (This Reduces To
Domestic Factors In Major Power.

* WARS of Retribution

A. WARS OF Aggression
1700-1815

B. WARS of Refusal
1. Britain 1940 (Britain Moved)
2. Damage of Peace Terms

C. WARS of Retribution
Major-Minor Power
WAR

* Components of A General Theory of WAR

- A. Structure
 ↳ Stable or Unstable
 Balance Power
- B. Institutions
 ↳ Domestic - WAR
 STATE / Peace Study
- C. Bargaining Institutions
- D. Outcomes (Predictions
 are Explanations)