

II Concepts - Information

A. Information About A State's Preferences For WAR And Peace

B. The Ability To Signal Most Important Interests May Be Vital To Detering WAR

1. Credible Commitment -

Costly / Because of Nature of Signal / Therefore Believable Signal

2. Deterrence - To Prevent Or Compel (Prevent) Using Threats / And C. Balancing

a. Balance of Powers Is Automatic Deterrence

3. Strategic Behavior - Bluffing And WAR

4. Example - Positioning of Military Force

I. The Divergent Theory - Institutionalism

A. First Premise: The Hypothesis of Non-Antagonistic Interests (Even In Anarchy)

B. First Deduction: The Balance of Power Is A Balance of $\times 6$ Status Quo (From Conflict to Cooperation - Caused by Domestic Institutional Factors)

C. Second Premise: The Duality of WAR-Fighting (Zero Benefits From A War In Itself Because of $\times 6$ Net Cost)

1. Cost of Defeat
2. Cost of Mobilizing
3. Cost of WAR Termination

* Cost of WAR

A. Cost of Defeat (Major WAR) - Damage

B. Cost of Mobilization (of Resources)

↳ Opportunity Cost

C. Cost of WAR

Termination (Iraq)

Second Deduction (D)

D. Hypothesis of \neq

Better Bargain C-

How Is WAR Ever Possible

1. Costs of WAR Fighting
Are less ($<$) Than \neq Costs
of Defeat, But Costs of
WAR Fighting Are Greater Than
The Costs of Bargaining C-

a. Benefits of Bargaining $>$

Benefits of WAR; Win Without
WAR (WW) $>$ (Payoff) Than

WAR AND Win (Ww) -

2. How Is WAR Possible

a. Regime Types: WAR STATES

b. Institutional Failure -

1. Absent Enforcement/Bargains

c. Incomplete Information: Regarding
Payoffs For WAR AND Peace d. Bluffing Problem

I. Institutional Explanation of W.W.I.

A. Two Levels: Domestic and International

B. Domestic - Presence or Absence of A WAR STATE (State with A First Preference for WAR - False)

A. Preferences for WAR of The Major Powers

4 = Win without WAR $4 > 3 > 2 > 1$

3 = Peace (Status Quo)

2 = WAR

1 = Defeat

B. WAR STATE - Externalization.

Hypothesis - False - Institutional

Constraints (1. Audience Costs (Public Opinion)
(2. Parliamentary Veto Power (WAR Credits

3.3. Institutional Instability
(Fear of Revolution) - Not
A Rational Strategy (WAR)

C. International Level Explanations

1. Absent Bargaining
Institution - False

a. Congresses, Dynastic
Networks

b. Diplomacy

2. Incomplete Information

- Plausible - Specific
Explanation - One C. More

Major Powers Lack Information
Concerning the Preferences For

WAR And Peace of An Adversary

- Believes Adversary Is Bluffing When
It Signals Contrary to WAR Choice

2. a But Adversary Is Not
Bluffing and will Choose
WAR If the Other Power
Chooses A Course of Action
The Adversary Either Considers
A Threat Or An Opportunity
To Expand Its Power on Both

2b. Austria-Hungary Threatens
Serbia's Survival In the
WAKE of the Assassination
of Heir); Russia Believes
This Will Cause Austria-H.
And Germany to Mobilize,
Thus Threatening Russia; Russia
Signals Resolve Will Mobilize/Austria-Hungary
Believes This Is A Bluff, Mobilizes.
Russia Counter-Mobilizes, WAR Results