

Terrorism throughout the World

This chapter applies principles set forth in the preceding chapters to specific historical examples of terrorism in the United States and elsewhere in the Americas, Europe and Russia, the Middle East, and Asia. It identifies the commonalities, differences, and trends in terrorism cross-nationally and concludes with a set of questions as to what might be expected over the coming decades.

A. Terrorism in the United States

Terrorism was not a major issue in the United States before September 11, 2001. There had been two serious attacks in the 1990s – the World Trade Center (WTC) bombing of 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 – but neither had the extraordinary domestic and international impact of 9/11. The 1993 WTC bombing was serious but caused just six deaths, and the Oklahoma City bombing, although killing 168 people, was the product of home-grown terrorists. The 9/11 attack was much deadlier than both of the earlier attacks, it involved extensive planning and years of preparation, and it was an attack by foreigners, which gave it enormous international significance, creating a vast divide between Islam and the West and stoking fires of fear and rage on both sides. This attack revealed in a highly sensational way the vulnerability of the United States to serious terrorist attacks. Terrorism suddenly became the dominant national concern and public policy priority.

Terrorism of domestic origin is quite different in several ways from terrorism produced by foreigners planning primarily from centers abroad. It differs

in nature, causes, consequences, and the mix of interventions appropriate for dealing with it. Domestic terrorism falls solidly within the domain of crime, whereas international terrorism, although a crime in most places in which it strikes, is also a matter of foreign affairs, calling for both diplomatic policy and military interventions. These two fundamentally different types of terrorism are considered separately in this chapter.¹

1. Terrorist Groups and Acts of Domestic Origin

Terrorism in the United States, as in virtually every other country, is for the most part a strictly domestic matter. It was noted in Chapter 3 that the raid in Kansas by John Brown in 1856 involved the killing of five unarmed citizens, committed, according to Brown, to fulfill God's will, with the expressed aim of striking terror in people he viewed as enemies. Since the end of the Civil War, the vast majority of victims of terrorism in the United States, as in other countries, were innocents killed by fellow citizens – in the American case, however, mostly through lynchings (see the Ku Klux Klan, described in Chapter 6). This tradition of terrorism primarily as a domestic matter continued through the last two decades of the twentieth century. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, which categorizes terrorist events and suspected terrorists as either “domestic” or “international,” estimates that of the nearly 500 terrorist incidents identified in the United States from 1980 to 2001, about two-thirds were home-grown (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004).

Domestic terrorism usually has a political rather than religious or ethnic motive, and the most basic political distinction is between left-wing and right-wing extremists. Brent Smith (1994) makes several useful distinctions between the two in terms of ideology, economic views, geographic sources of support, tactics, and the targets chosen. Left-wing terrorists tend to have a Marxist orientation, oppose the economic status quo, operate predominantly in urban settings and in small cells (often finding sanctuary in safe houses), and often attack symbolic targets of oppression. Right-wing terrorists are, not surprisingly, nearly the opposite. Although they vary in their views of economic matters and tend to be less ideologically committed than their left-wing counterparts, right-wing terrorists tend to be anti-Marxist, usually operate in rural settings, often live in camps or compounds, are often connected to national networks of like-minded extremists, and hit targets that symbolize central government. They tend also to identify strongly with Christian fundamentalism.

Smith has found demographic differences as well between left- and right-wing terrorist groups in the United States. Right-wing group members tend to be about four or five years older, on average, than left-wing members; more predominantly male and white; and much less likely to be college graduates than members of left-wing groups.

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Left-Wing Extremism and Terrorism: Working-Class Violence. Most people today associate left-wing violence in America with the extreme radical fringe of the Vietnam protest era. But a legacy of radical violence preceded the Vietnam-era extremism in the United States by nearly a century, with a wave of labor violence following the Civil War. One of the most prominent of these events was a labor riot in Rock Springs, Wyoming, in 1885, which combined labor unrest with racism. Tension had grown between Chinese and European immigrant workers in the Union Pacific Coal mines located in Sweetwater County, Wyoming, due largely to the fact that the Chinese miners were unhappy about receiving lower wage rates than the Caucasians for doing the same work. The problem was exacerbated by racial and ethnic tension – the whites, for example, routinely referred to the Chinese as “coolies.” The tension burst eventually into full-blown rioting and acts of terrorism, resulting in the deaths of twenty-eight Chinese miners, injuries to many others, and the burning of seventy-five homes of the Chinese workers. The white offenders were neither arrested nor prosecuted. Instead, coverage of the event, both in Wyoming newspapers and that published elsewhere, was mostly positive about the outcome. Soon after the Rock Springs massacre, a wave of sympathy riots broke out against Chinese laborers in the Washington territory (now Washington State; McLain, 1996; Saxton, 1971).

The following year a working-class riot erupted in downtown Chicago, when police decided to break up what had been a peaceful rally of striking labor activists. The Haymarket rally became the Haymarket riot when a demonstrator hurled a bomb at the advancing police line, killing an officer. The officers responded by opening fire on the demonstrators. When the smoke had cleared, seven policemen and at least four workers were dead, with roughly ten times as many on both sides injured (Avrich, 1986; Green, 2007).

Left-Wing Extremism and Terrorism: The New Left Protest Movement. Far left extremism shifted fairly sharply throughout the world in the late 1960s and early '70s – from labor union interests of the Depression generation to social issues of the generations that followed, particularly war, authoritarianism, and social injustice. Much of this new wave of radicalism was centered in the United States. At the vanguard of this movement was the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), created in 1962 by Tom Hayden.² The SDS was not a primarily terrorist group, as it followed the nonviolent protest approach used effectively by civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr., with the expressed aim of expanding “participatory democracy” in the United States. The SDS operated under a large tent as an awkward alliance of peaceful liberals and more militant activists; it was at the forefront of the antiwar movement, which swept college campuses during the Vietnam War. As the war grew ever larger and more deadly, the SDS became increasingly

militant, and although its nonviolent emphasis kept it mostly out of terrorist activities, its influence declined as many of its most influential members abandoned the SDS to join groups with more aggressive agendas.

Perhaps the most prominent SDS splinter group was the Weather Underground (or “Weathermen”), a group founded by Mark Rudd in 1969. As noted in Chapter 3, the Weathermen set off bombs in several large cities from the Pacific to the Atlantic coasts in the early 1970s, largely to express opposition not just to the Vietnam War but to what they regarded as an oppressive capitalist government that they aimed to overthrow. The group was predominantly white, upper middle class, educated, and young; but what brought them together was a rejection of nonviolent approaches to dealing with the system. They committed dozens of bombings that targeted military establishments, including the Pentagon, as well as police stations, campus ROTC buildings, and the Gulf Oil corporate headquarters in Pittsburgh, to name a few. They also freed the counterculture LSD hero, Timothy Leary, from prison and arranged his flight to Algeria, and they distributed revolutionary literature to rally support for their cause. They disintegrated, for the most part, by the mid-1970s, although a few diehard Weathermen continued to commit occasional acts of violence into the 1980s.

Another extremist SDS splinter group was the United Freedom Front (UFF), a small but prolifically violent group that focused on the radicalization of prisoners. Led by Vietnam veteran Raymond Luc Levasseur, the UFF was known to have committed about thirty robberies and bombings in the Northeast from 1975 through 1984. All of its eight known members were convicted and imprisoned by the end of the 1980s, following sensational trials highlighted by the histrionics of UFF defense lawyer William Kunstler (B. Smith, 1994).

Another prominent radical group from the New Left was the Black Panther Party, an African American militant group founded by Huey Newton and Bobby Seale in Oakland in 1966. Inspired by Malcolm X (1992) and Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong, the Black Panthers were created out of countercultural ideas that extended well beyond the racial and social justice themes of the mainstream civil rights movement. The Black Panthers called for black nationalism and armed resistance to what they regarded as racial, social, and economic oppression, and they expressed strong disdain for the white-dominated law enforcement establishment and the formal system of justice in the United States.

The Black Panthers reinforced their message with symbols of bravado: the black-gloved fist, paramilitary black beret, shotgun slung over the shoulder, and Malcolm X’s notorious slogan, “freedom by any means necessary.” But their links to violence went beyond mere symbols. They are reported to have killed more than a dozen police officers (Ayron, 2006). One of the Black Panther leaders, Eldridge Cleaver, with a fellow Panther, wounded three

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police officers in a 1968 shootout in Oakland. He jumped bail and fled to Mexico City and then to Cuba, Paris, and Algeria, where he was hailed as an international hero. Cleaver's famous book, *Soul on Ice* (1967), asserts at one point that he had regarded rapes he had committed to be "insurrectionary" acts.

The Black Panthers were just two years old when, in 1968, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover called the group "the greatest threat to the internal security of the country" (Stohl, 1988, p. 249). The group eventually came apart after a few years due to a combination of close federal and local law enforcement attention to their every move and the internal feuding among its leaders – Newton and Seale promoted the racially neutral Maoist slogan, "Power to the people," whereas Eldridge Cleaver and Stokely Carmichael promoted the more incendiary "Black Power" slogan. Some of its members were killed and some went to prison, whereas others joined radical underground movements. Many of those who survived went on to lead peaceful black middle-class lives.

Although the run of the Black Panthers was pretty much over by 1970, the group inspired black liberation movements elsewhere. One such movement was the Black Liberation Army (BLA), an underground organization led by former Panther Assata Shakur (previously known under her given name, JoAnne Chesimard).³ The BLA had two distinct components: one in San Francisco, across the bay from the Panther's Oakland home base, and the other in New York City. Both cells hit local police departments with gunfire and bombing attacks, and both raised funds by robbing banks. Shakur was convicted as an accessory in the killing of a New Jersey state trooper in 1977, then escaped from prison in 1979, and fled the United States for Cuba, where she was granted political asylum by Fidel Castro in 1984 (K. Cleaver, 2005; Martin, 2006). In 2005 the FBI offered a \$1 million reward for information leading to her capture (Williams, 2005).

Another group that rose from the ashes of the Black Panthers was the May 19 Communist Organization (M19CO), named in honor of the same-day birthdays of Malcolm X and Ho Chi Minh, the leader first of the Viet Cong and then of Vietnam. The M19CO was formed in the late 1970s by former members of the Panthers, the BLA, and the Weather Underground. They carried forward the tradition of revolutionary violence of these earlier groups, committing robberies of banks and armored vehicles, bombings of "establishment" targets, and the freeing of comrades in custody, including Assata Shakur's 1979 "rescue" from a New Jersey prison and transport to Cuba. In 1981 the group killed a Brinks security guard and two police officers in the course of a robbery in Nyack, New York, after which key members Kathy Boudin and David Gilbert were arrested and convicted of murder and robbery. The group's violence came to an end in 1985 with the arrest of its last remaining members (Martin, 2006).

One additional African American group is noteworthy: the El Rukn gang. Originally a conventional Chicago street gang known as the Blackstone Rangers, the El Rukns are significant largely for their Muslim connection. The Blackstone Rangers became "El Rukns" after their leader, Jeff Fort, was influenced by the Black Muslim movement while imprisoned in the late 1970s. (Fort borrowed the name "El Rukns" from the cornerstone of the shrine of Kaaba, regarded by many Muslims as Islam's holiest shrine, in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.) Fort and some of his El Rukn associates made contact with Libyan operatives, with the aim of committing terrorist acts in the United States. They never did. Fort and many of his associates ended up in prison. Of special significance is the fact that federal officials, concerned about the prospect of growing bonds between Black Muslims and Islamic terrorists, committed Fort to the maximum security prison at Florence, Colorado, where he was confined under a no-human-contact order.

Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism. Several right-wing extremist groups were described in Chapter 6, including the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacist groups, as well as the Minutemen and other private militia groups. These groups fit clearly within Smith's characterizations of right-wing terrorist groups. Although anti-Marxism is not a leading grievance of most hate groups and militia extremists, they do tend to be anti-collectivist and strongly opposed to federal, state, and local governments, which they regard as intrusive of their property and rights. They tend to be particularly protective of their rights to be left alone and to defend themselves with firearms. These groups are based usually outside of urban settings, occasionally barricaded in fortresses. And they often justify their actions based on notions of morality grounded in religious fundamentalism. When they engage in terrorist activities, it is generally against minority individuals and institutions, immigrants, homosexuals, or abortion clinics.

2. Terrorist Groups and Acts of International Origin

Other terrorist groups active in the United States originated outside the fifty states. Because they are driven by forces largely outside the authority of federal and local law enforcement officials, they are more difficult to monitor and control. Previous chapters give several reasons for the growth of the threat of transnational terrorism, including alienation and extremism, historical trajectories and periods of clashing civilizations, accessible and lethal new technologies, attraction to the prospect of successfully striking the world's greatest military and economic power and terrifying its citizens, megalomania, achieving notoriety, and so on.

Several transnational terrorist groups have committed acts of terrorism in the United States. In this section we describe three of the most prominent: Puerto Rican leftists, Cuban nationals, and al Qaeda. Others include the

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Irish Republican Army and Libyan, Palestinian, and Syrian groups, which are described elsewhere in this book (see Chapters 3 and 6 and other sections of this chapter).

Puerto Rican Separatists. Puerto Rico is a territory of the United States and Puerto Ricans are officially American citizens, so a strong case can be made for regarding acts of terrorism by Puerto Rican separatists as acts of domestic terrorism. At the same time, however, Puerto Ricans do not have the full rights of American citizens in the fifty states. Puerto Ricans elect a governor, yet their head of state is the president of the United States, for whom they are not allowed to vote. The problem is compounded by another type of disenfranchisement: Puerto Rico's representation in the U.S. Congress is limited to a single nonvoting delegate. Not surprisingly, many Puerto Ricans do not regard themselves as full citizens and have long argued for Puerto Rico to become a sovereign nation with full political independence from the United States. Since the mid-nineteenth century, debates over independence have been stimulated by a legitimate political party for independence, *Lucha por la Independencia Puertorriqueña*.

Occasionally, separatists (*independencistas*) frustrated by the failure of the political process to produce the desired outcome have turned to violence. In 1950, a pair of Puerto Rican separatists attempted to assassinate President Harry Truman while he was residing at the Blair House, across the street from the White House. Although the president was unharmed, the pair killed a White House police officer protecting Truman. About three and a half years later, four Puerto Rican terrorists shot and wounded five members of the U.S. House of Representatives.

The most devastating expression of organized violence for independence has come from a group created in 1974, the *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional* (Armed Forces of National Liberation), commonly referred to as the FALN. The FALN has been not only one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the history of Puerto Rico but also one of the more destructive terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere. From 1974 to 1983, the FALN was responsible for more than 120 bomb attacks on U.S. targets – mostly restaurants, banks, and office buildings in New York and Chicago. No other foreign group has launched as many terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. The deadliest attack, on New York's Fraunces Tavern in 1975, killed four people and injured more than fifty others. In 1980, armed members of the FALN raided the presidential campaign headquarters of both the Carter campaign in Chicago and the Bush campaign in New York.

The FALN's activities came to a virtual end in 1980, when eleven of its members were arrested for attempting to rob an armored truck at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois. FALN co-founder, Filiberto Ojeda Ríos, then evaded capture for years. He was finally killed by FBI agents in 2005, after being for several years on the FBI's list of most-wanted fugitives.

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One of the most controversial episodes involving the FALN occurred about fifteen years after the group's last attack, when President Bill Clinton offered clemency to sixteen imprisoned members of the FALN. Twelve accepted the terms of the offer and were released (see Box 8.1).

Several groups have carried forward the work of the FALN after its demise, the most prominent of which has been the Macheteros ("machete wielders"). Operating out of Puerto Rico and the Hartford, Connecticut, area, the Macheteros committed numerous bombings and attempted assassinations during the 1980s. Other Puerto Rican separatist groups that have picked up where the FALN left off include the Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution, the Armed Forces of Popular Resistance, the Guerrilla Forces of Liberation, and the Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary Forces (Smith, 1994).

Cuban Nationals. The words etched in bronze at the Statue of Liberty, "Give me your . . . huddled masses, yearning to breathe free," have been a welcoming call for alienated people around the world. The United States has been especially attractive to refugees from Cuba – just ninety miles off the coast of Florida – since the overthrow of the Batista regime by Fidel Castro's band of guerrillas on January 1, 1959. Castro's revolution set off a major political and social upheaval, including the loss of wealth, power, and status of the Cuban middle class and professionals. An initial wave of Cuban refugees to the United States in 1959 was followed by a second wave in 1961, when Castro nationalized private land and capital assets and cracked down heavily on political opposition, including the execution of some dissidents. The exodus continued for years. In 1980 alone, more than 125,000 refugees came to the United States, despite U.S. Coast Guard attempts to stem the flow, in a wave that came to be known as the "Mariel Boatlift" (named for the harbor from which the refugees departed). The U.S. Census Bureau reported that more than 1.2 million Cubans lived in the United States by 2000, a figure that did not take into account the many others who had fled from Cuba to the United States during the previous forty years who had died since of natural causes. Indeed, about 20 percent of Cuba's 1959 population fled to the United States, with the majority ending up in the Miami area.

It should come as no surprise that a number of extremists and terrorists would eventually emerge from such a huge population of refugees. Many Cuban refugees indeed felt betrayed by Castro, and they dedicated themselves to his overthrow. Some were sufficiently obsessed with this goal to attempt to undermine him even if it meant breaking U.S. laws, including making attacks on pro-Castro individuals and institutions in the United States. A handful of the most extreme counter-revolutionaries formed a terrorist group that called itself Omega 7. Founded by the former Cuban wrestling champion, Eduardo Arocena, in the mid-1970s, Omega 7 engaged in dozens of attacks against Cuban diplomats and businesses, including several shootings and

Box 8.1. Should Convicted Terrorists Ever be Given Clemency?

In 1999, President Bill Clinton offered clemency for sixteen members of the FALN who had been convicted and imprisoned for a variety of serious felony offenses related to terrorist activities committed in New York and Chicago during the 1970s and early '80s. The crimes included bank robbery, bomb making, illegal possession and transport of firearms, explosives violations, interference with interstate commerce by threats or violence, stolen vehicle violations, theft of interstate shipments, and seditious conspiracy.

Ordinarily, public officials are inclined to show little mercy for terrorists. But these were exceptional cases in several respects. None of the sixteen had been convicted of bombing or of any other crimes causing injury to others. All had served terms of at least nineteen years in prison, more time than was ordinarily served for such crimes in the 1990s. The organization the men had belonged to had been dormant for many years.

President Clinton set three conditions for clemency: the FALN members had to (1) agree to renounce violence, (2) admit to the crimes for which they were convicted, and (3) agree not to re-establish associations with one another after release from prison. Twelve accepted the offer and were released or paroled.

The deal was hotly contested. It was strongly supported by ten Nobel Prize laureates and by former President Jimmy Carter, Cardinal O'Connor of New York, Archbishop Nieves of Puerto Rico, politicians and members of the Puerto Rico independence movement, officials of human rights organizations, and others. It was opposed with equal fervor by several others: the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, officials at the FBI and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, police organizations, and former victims of FALN terrorist activities. Even Hillary Clinton – at the time running for U.S. Senate for the state of New York – was critical of her husband's decision to grant clemency to the twelve who accepted the terms. In her opinion, it had taken too long for the prisoners to renounce violence (Black, 1999).

What do you think of Mr. Clinton's decision? Should convicted terrorists ever have their prison terms shortened? Under what circumstances, if any, might this be worth doing? What strikes you as the most critical factors that should weigh in the decision? Does clemency for terrorists undermine the integrity of the justice system? Should sentencing policies for terrorists differ from those for other criminals? Are these primarily matters of effectiveness or matters of ethics?

bombings in New York and New Jersey. Arocena was arrested in 1983 and sentenced the following year to a life term for the 1980 murder of Felix Garcia Rodriguez, an attache at the Cuban mission to the United Nations.

Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is, without question, the most notorious and probably the most dangerous of all terrorist groups – due principally to its central role in planning and executing the most sensational terrorist attack in the history of the United States and, arguably, the most significant in recorded history to date.⁴ Al Qaeda was created by Osama bin Laden and his associates in 1988 or 1989, following the expulsion of the Soviet military from Afghanistan. Among the mujahideen entities that defeated the technologically superior Soviet forces was Maktab al-Khadamat, a precursor to al Qaeda, founded by bin Laden.

“Al Qaeda” is Arabic for “the base”; bin Laden saw the organization in its early days as the base of operations against his targets. Then, as now, the central goal of al Qaeda was to expel any and all non-Muslim influences – the “far enemy” – from Muslim lands, and particularly the removal of the Jews from what bin Laden calls “Palestine”; he regards the creation of Israel in 1947 as an artifice of the United Nations, instigated largely by Zionist forces in the United States and Great Britain. Bin Laden’s successes, first in Afghanistan and then elsewhere throughout much of world, emboldened him and his al Qaeda organization to work both to expel the far enemy and to overthrow the “near enemy” as well – Muslim regimes that collaborate with the West – replacing them eventually with a pure Sunni-dominated Islamic caliphate (Laden, 2005). One of bin Laden’s early targets was the Saudi monarchy, with which his family, ironically, has had long, close ties.

Largely because of U.S. support of the Saudi government – regarded as “veiled colonialism” by al Qaeda strategists (Pape, 2005, pp. 117–19) – bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization began to target the United States, the “far enemy,” in the 1990s. There was further irony here, as bin Laden had sided with both the United States and Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, receiving support as a mujahideen leader from the Saudis to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan (Cook, 2005). Equally ironic is the fact that Afghan mujahideen leaders found bin Laden to be “useless” in their struggle against the Soviets, regarding him as a lazy, pathetic figure (L. Wright, 2006a).

Yet, during the 1990s, al Qaeda – headed by bin Laden and his chief associate, Ayman Zawahiri – had become an organization that could effectively recruit, train, finance, and direct terrorist attacks against the United States, as well as against targets in northeastern Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. In 1993, al Qaeda struck the World Trade Center with a deadly truck bomb; it then killed hundreds of people, mostly Africans, in bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, and it killed seventeen sailors aboard the *USS Cole* in Yemen in 2000.

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These incidents were relatively minor, however, when compared to the unprecedented destruction of 9/11 targets in New York and Washington, two of the most powerful cities in the world. One can only wonder, What sort of men did bin Laden attract to al Qaeda who would be willing to commit suicide bombing on such a grand scale? According to Lawrence Wright, they were a strange mixture of idealists and nihilists:

From the beginning of Al Qaeda, there were reformers and there were nihilists. The dynamic between them was irreconcilable and self-destructive, but events were moving so quickly that it was almost impossible to tell the philosophers from the sociopaths. They were glued together by the charismatic personality of Osama bin Laden, which contained both strands, idealism and nihilism, in a potent mix (2006a, p. 187).

The 9/11 strike on the U.S. was shocking and devastating, but the response was even more devastating. Al Qaeda's training camps in Afghanistan were totally destroyed within a few short weeks of the 9/11 attack, and the Taliban government that had provided sanctuary for those camps was quickly brought down by a crushing air and ground attack led by the United States. With the successful destruction of al Qaeda's base of operations in Afghanistan in the months following 9/11, its leaders retreated to rugged mountain hideaways in eastern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan, largely cut off from its operational cells around the globe. For at least a few years, the organization became less involved in the planning and direction of terrorist attacks; it became more of an inspiration for terrorist activities that were planned and executed by others.

Al Qaeda's cells operate today in various parts of the world with considerable autonomy. Some terrorist groups have neither received al Qaeda training nor met bin Laden or any of his key associates, but nonetheless regard themselves as inspired by the organization. It is therefore impossible to estimate the size of al Qaeda with any reliability.

One can, however, say something about al Qaeda's members based on the most committed of them – those who have killed themselves in suicide bombing attacks. Robert Pape's (2005) analysis of the seventy-one individuals who committed suicide bombings in al Qaeda missions from 1995 to 2003 reveals that they were twice as likely to come from countries with large Islamic fundamentalist populations than from countries with little or no fundamentalist populations; ten times more likely to come from Sunni Muslim countries with an American military presence than from other Sunni Muslim countries; and twenty times more likely to come from Sunni Muslim countries with both an American military presence and large Islamic fundamentalist populations.⁵ Pape concludes, "American military policy in the Persian Gulf was most likely the pivotal factor leading to September 11" (2005, pp. 103–04). He adds,

Al-Qaeda is less a transnational network of like-minded ideologues brought together from across the globe via the Internet than a cross-national military alliance of national liberation movements working together against what they see as a common imperial threat. . . . (T)he pattern of who ultimately decides to die for al-Qaeda's cause is remarkably consistent with the argument that al-Qaeda leaders make (p. 104).

The argument to which Pape alludes has been made most compellingly by one of al Qaeda's most mysterious strategists: Abu Bakr Naji. In 2004 Naji posted a document on the Internet, entitled *The Management of Savagery*. The precise nature and extent of Naji's role in al Qaeda are unclear and, for that matter, just who he (or she) is, if he is a real person,⁶ and, if so, where he was raised and educated, where he lives, and so on. It is clear, however, that much of the modus operandi of al Qaeda, as revealed both on the ground and through the al Qaeda Internet propaganda machinery, is consistent with the principles set forth in Naji's widely circulated manuscript. Box 8.2 contrasts the principles described in that document with the logic of the American position, revealed in a collection of interventions that have fallen under the umbrella known as the "war on terror."

B. From Mexico to South America: Narcoterrorism and Leftist Terrorism

Terrorist incidents have been much more frequent and, overall, more deadly in Latin America than in the United States and Canada over the past several decades. Terrorism in Mexico, Central America, and South America is predominantly of two types – drug-related terrorism and terrorism by leftist groups – although there is occasionally some overlap, as groups with political agendas sometimes finance their operations through drug trafficking.

One might reasonably question whether the acts of violence associated with drug trafficking qualify fully as terrorism rather than as street crime. Drug trafficking, per se, is not terrorism, even when used to finance terrorist operations. As BBC correspondent Misha Glenny (2007) observes, "International mobsters, unlike terrorists, don't seek to bring down the West; they just want to make a buck." Terror used as an instrument to protect or expand profits has a limited political agenda: it aims to alter the justice system so that it provides a haven for a particular group, not to overthrow the entire government to achieve an ideological objective. But a limited political agenda is greater than none, and the use of violence by drug cartels against innocents to invoke fear and change the way the government operates is a fact of life. Drug groups that engage extensively in such activities operate at the margin of terrorism and so are worthy of consideration in a comprehensive treatment of terrorism.

Box 8.2. The War on Terror vs. The Management of Savagery

The essential rationale behind the U.S. war on terror is described in Chapter 1. It involves specific military engagements and legislation, yet it is no less political rhetoric designed to win public support for a miscellaneous assortment of interventions and policies, rather than a coherent doctrine or strategy. The interventions and the associated rhetoric were certainly effective for garnering support from a majority of voters throughout the United States from 2001 until the presidential election of 2004. The most significant benefit was the absence of a major terrorist event on U.S. soil for several years after the September 11 attack – likely a product of enhanced airport security, the removal of al Qaeda headquarters and training camps in Afghanistan, and sanctions that induced Libya to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Voter support had dwindled substantially, however, by the mid-term election of 2006.

It is useful to contrast the central elements of the war on terror – military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, changes in the law to enhance the ability of domestic and foreign intelligence authorities to detect terrorist activities under the USA Patriot Act, the integration of intelligence operations under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and a reorganization of executive branch offices within the Department of Homeland Security – with the doctrine and principles set forth in Abu Bakr Naji's 113-page Internet document, *Management of Savagery* (*Idarat al-Tawahhush* in Arabic, alternatively translated into English as "Management of Barbarism" or "Management of Chaos").

In *Management of Savagery*, Naji presents a set of principles and a general strategy for a jihadi victory over the West. He urges fellow jihadists to read up on the principles and practices of Western management, military strategy and tactics, politics, and sociology. The document promotes the purposeful use of asymmetric warfare – disrupting and exhausting the enemy through infiltration and deception and by dispersing attacks on targets where they are weakest and do not have the capacity to respond effectively. It also emphasizes victory in the critical propaganda war over the West through the use of battle approaches that provoke angry military responses and exploit the West's political weaknesses – especially our impatience and bias toward quick results. Naji argues that the media on both sides will report the harsh responses and military errors, and the negative publicity will wear down the will of the West before long, thereby gaining more converts to holy war and martyrdom.

The document will not win Naji a Nobel Peace Prize. It is relentlessly hostile toward non-Muslims and truly advocates savagery. Naji observes, for

example, that there can be no forgiveness for an apostate unless he converts to Islam: "Even when he converts, we have the option of either forgiving him or killing him, because he has repented after he had the capacity to do so earlier" (translation, p: 113). It is equally ruthless in enforcing obedience among Muslims and rooting out deviant opinions and "collaborators in our ranks" (p. 152).

Still, for Naji "managing savagery" means finding a balance. When al Qaeda field general Abu Musab al-Zarqawi committed a series of atrocities against Shi'ites in Iraq and a wedding party in Jordan in 2005, chief al Qaeda strategist Ayman al-Zawahiri reprimanded him for his excesses, describing his actions as "unpalatable" at a time when "we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our *ummah* (the international Muslim community)."

Managing savagery also requires that the mujahideen win the support of the people by doing the following:

- establishing internal security
- providing food and medical supplies
- providing an armed force to defend the zone of battle from external attack
- establishing Shari'a justice and an intelligence service
- providing economic sufficiency
- defending against hypocrisy and deviant opinions and ensuring obedience
- establishing alliances with neighboring groups

The result, according to Naji, will be victory both on the ground and in the minds of the people, as public outrage against the West's occupation of Muslim land and misguided acts of retaliation will exceed the outrage evoked by jihadi savagery.

This strategy worked against the Soviets in Afghanistan, says Naji, and he argues that it should work as effectively against the United States in the Middle East, especially if jihadis can shift from effectiveness in battle to competence in governing civilian populations. The goodwill that Hezbollah created through its social development programs in Southern Lebanon attests to the wisdom of such a strategy.

Many in the West have been extremely critical of the manner in which the United States responded to the immediate threats presented by al Qaeda. Rather than respond to al Qaeda's attack by targeting its military resources principally against al Qaeda and giving more attention to diplomacy and building of infrastructure in countries in need of such aid, the U.S. government elected instead, using the rhetoric of the war on terror, to deploy the majority of its resources to the military effort in Iraq, where al Qaeda had no significant presence at the time of the 2003 invasion. Rather than try to understand our

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adversary and their culture, as al Qaeda has done with aspects of ours, we acted under the false premise that Iraqis care as much about freedom and democracy as they do about dignity and Islamic concepts of justice. The U.S. response to al Qaeda's attack on New York and Washington thus followed Naji's script in many essential respects.⁷

History will judge whether Naji's thinking was more effective over the long term than the reasoning behind the U.S. war on terror. In the meantime, it is clear that events unfolded in the years following the 9/11 attack – on the streets of Baghdad and Tehran and in the court of public opinion throughout the world – in a manner that suggests the presence of Naji's strategy and its having served al Qaeda's objectives all too well in the face of our war on terror.

The term “narcoterrorism” is often used to describe terrorism associated with drug trafficking. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) defines this term in such a way as to include both terror as an instrument for increasing profits from drug trafficking – the original definition of narcoterrorism – and, following a DEA amendment to this definition, drug trafficking as a means of financing terrorist activities (Casteel, 2003). The term may be useful as an umbrella that includes different types of associations between drug trafficking and terrorism, although the distinctions are critical. Combining the two raises another risk: drug enforcement officials in particular, and government officials in general, may have strong bureaucratic incentives to err on the side of seeing drug links to terrorism where none exist (Adams, 1986).

One high-ranking official has expressed concern that narcoterrorism in Latin America is even fueling radical Islamic groups in the Middle East.⁸ An estimated \$6 billion is laundered from the sale of some twelve tons of cocaine annually in the Tri-Border (or “Triple Frontier”) region, where the boundaries of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay intersect (Adams, 1986). The town of Ciudad del Este (Paraguay), a population center in this region, is home to about 20,000 Muslim Arabs, a great many of whom immigrated from Lebanon in the 1980s. Reports from the intelligence community indicate a significant pool of extremists among this population (Goldberg, 2002b).

The history of terrorist activities from Mexico to Central and South America provides rich examples of both types of narcoterrorism, as well as terrorism by leftist groups that does not involve drug trafficking. We take up narcoterrorist groups first and then turn to leftist terrorists.

1. The Tijuana (Arellano Felix) Drug Cartel

The Arellano Felix cartel, operating out of the far northwest corner of Mexico, exemplifies the first type of narcoterrorism: terror as an instrument of trafficking in drugs. Drug trafficking is a big business in Mexico. More than half of the marijuana and an estimated 90 percent of the cocaine consumed in the United States comes from Mexico (Noriega, 2007). Much of the drugs transported through Mexico are grown in Central and South America. Individual sellers often find that they can maximize profits by organizing as cartels, thereby maintaining high drug prices. Enforcement mechanisms are usually put in place to ensure that individual members do not underprice other members of the cartel, even if they result in a reduction in the amounts sold.

The attractiveness of drug trafficking derives principally from the profits derived from moving cocaine, heroin, and marijuana from the grower to the processor, through the wholesale distribution network, and finally to the retail buyer. The profits at each stage can be enormous. And the more effective the enforcement at each of these levels, the greater the profits needed to compensate sellers for the higher risks of getting caught in the drug trade. More enforcement thus raises drug prices, which in turn creates more incentive to face the risks of getting caught and more incentive to either bribe law enforcement officials or fight them, thus opening the door to terrorism. In Mexico, these pressures are exacerbated by the strong demand for drugs from the United States and strong pressures from the U.S. government to induce Mexico to crack down on traffickers. Because of these pressures, the trafficking of drugs in Mexico frequently manifests as terrorist activity.

The Mexican drug distribution market is partitioned largely along regional lines, with cartels controlling the western, central, and eastern parts of the country. One of the largest drug trafficking organizations in all of Mexico has been the Arellano Felix cartel, operating in the northwest of Mexico and headquartered in Tijuana. This cartel was run by a family of seven brothers and four sisters, led originally by Ramon Eduardo Arellano Felix, who in 1997 was added to the FBI's most-wanted list for the many acts of deadly violence he either directed or committed. Ramon Arellano Felix and his siblings inherited the substantial Tijuana cartel in 1989 from their uncle, Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo ("El Padrino"), when Gallardo was arrested and incarcerated for drug trafficking and violent crimes. The leader of the Guadalajara cartel in the 1980s, Gallardo had been widely regarded as the cocaine czar of Mexico (Ehrenfeld, 1992).

The Arellano Felix cartel was especially violent in the 1990s, when its members assassinated not only police chiefs, prosecutors, and other government officials but also civilians, including journalists and children (the latter

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mostly when entire families of rival gangs were killed). The cartel was mostly closed down in 2002, when Ramon was killed in a police shootout and his brother Benjamin, Ramon's second-in-command, was arrested and incarcerated in one of Mexico's most secure prisons. The market continued to flourish, however, as rival drug trafficking gangs soon took over the Tijuana cartel territory.

2. Colombian Drug Cartels

Narcoterrorism has been waged on an even grander scale in Colombia, South America. Two drug cartels have been especially violent, operating out of two of the country's three largest cities: Medellin in the north and Cali to the south.

The Medellin cartel. During its twenty years in operation, the Medellin cartel has been the more significant of these two Colombian drug giants, both in drug trafficking and in violence. At its peak, it controlled an estimated 80 percent of the cocaine market, with revenues estimated at \$60 million per month and a net worth in the neighborhood of \$30 billion. The cartel's primary product was cocaine, most of which it purchased from growers in Peru and Bolivia. On the selling side, the cartel's largest market was the United States, where the demand for cocaine had soared in the 1980s, especially in the form of crack. It trafficked in drugs also in Europe and Asia. Its most lucrative market was to wholesalers in Miami, who then distributed the product to other major urban centers throughout the United States.

Built by Pablo Escobar in the early 1970s, the Medellin cartel eventually became one of the most violent organizations in the world. It began by bribing officials extensively; when bribery failed, it escalated to intimidation and assassination, starting in 1976. This strategy became known as *plata o plomo* – the official was given the choice of silver or lead. Over the next seventeen years, many chose lead: the cartel killed more than 1,000 police officers and military personnel – more than 500 police officers in Medellin alone – and assassinated hundreds of other public officials and more than 100 judges, as well as dozens of journalists and other civilians. Members of the Medellin cartel even killed presidential candidates and supreme court judges. In 1989, the cartel declared war against the Colombian government.

Escobar was the driving force behind this machine of greed and destruction. He graduated from car thief to the more lucrative drug trade as a teenager. Both his operation and reputation for ruthlessness soared in 1975, when he killed a leading drug-dealing rival. In 1989 *Forbes* magazine listed him as the world's seventh richest person. Fearing extradition to the United States, Escobar was killed in a shootout with the Colombian police in 1993.

The Cali cartel. The Cali cartel was less violent than Escobar's Medellin cartel – being more prone to bribing government officials than to killing them.

It was also less hierarchical, organized more loosely around independently functioning cells. Created around 1970 by brothers Gilberto and Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela, with an associate, José Santacruz Londoño, the group's first drug trafficking operations were in marijuana. It moved before long into the higher profit market of cocaine trafficking.

The Cali cartel qualifies nonetheless as a terrorist organization both for its extensive use of threats against government officials and its killing of several hundred prostitutes, homosexuals, homeless people, and petty thieves, as well as children, during its social cleansing operations against the “*desechables*,” those it regarded as discardable (Castells, 2000).

The Cali cartel competed fiercely with the Medellín cartel in its operations both in Colombia and elsewhere, but the two cartels occasionally made accommodations to each other. In the United States, Cali focused its operations principally in New York, whereas the Medellín group targeted the Miami area. The Cali cartel took over much of the Medellín's territory and operations after Escobar's death in 1993. Most of the leaders of the Cali cartel were arrested and imprisoned in 1995, but they continued to run the organization from prison. In 2006, the Orejuela brothers were extradited to the United States and convicted on drug conspiracy charges for their extensive operations in cocaine trafficking in the United States. Their plea agreement included the forfeiture of \$2.1 billion in assets.

3. The Zapatista National Liberation Front

An important class of terrorism has been characterized by terrorism authority Gus Martin (2006) as “dissident terrorism” or “terror from below”: this is terrorism committed by nonstate groups against governments and other institutions with whom they have sufficient grievances to resort to politically motivated violence. Martin puts the Zapatista National Liberation Front (*Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*, EZLN) squarely in this category.

The EZLN derives its name from Emilio Zapata, an icon in Mexican history, who is widely regarded, with Francisco “Pancho” Villa, as one of the two dominant figures of the Mexican Revolution of 1910–20. Zapata is a hero of the left largely for championing the transfer of land from an unworthy group – the rich, who simply inherited it from their European ancestors – to its rightful owners, the Mayan natives who worked these haciendas for centuries as slaves, after having lived on it in freedom for centuries before that. The EZLN sees itself as an armed revolutionary group fighting for the descendants of the people for whom Zapata fought nearly 100 years ago, and against today's heirs to the colonialists who conquered the indigenous people centuries ago.

The Zapatistas are based in one of the poorest states of Mexico, Chiapas; it is the southernmost state of Mexico, neighboring Guatemala (the country

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at the northwestern end of Central America). The EZLN regards the regimes operating out of Mexico City as illegitimate pawns of an international system of corrupt capitalism. It works toward the goal of shifting power from the wealthy to the poor and from Mexico City to the Mexican Indians, particularly in Chiapas.

The EZLN was officially formed on January 1, 1994, the very day that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect. Sold as a pathway to jobs for the poor in Mexico, NAFTA, and the larger trend toward globalization, is seen instead by the Zapatistas as a force disrupting the culture and lifestyle of Mexico's indigenous population, particularly in the south; for the Zapatistas, NAFTA tilts the playing field steeply against the simple agrarian economy of Chiapas, which is incapable of competing with the heavily subsidized agribusiness behemoth to the north.

In response to the imposition of NAFTA, the EZLN seized four cities in armed protest, including San Cristobal, a city of about 200,000 residents. The Mexican Army responded, in turn, with considerable force, first removing the EZLN from San Cristobal and the other cities and then bottling them up in rural strongholds. The Mexican Army was soon joined by paramilitaries supported by local landowners, who were overwhelmingly opposed to the Zapatistas. Several massacres ensued, the most serious in the Chiapas town of Acteal, where forty-five people, mostly women and children, were killed in 1997 – after a national peace accord had already been signed by the principals. About 100 people were killed in other towns. The Zapatistas retreated into the wilds of the Lacandon Jungle to regroup. They re-emerged during the following years as a legitimate political force representing Mexico's indigenous populations.

Although the Zapatistas qualified technically as a terrorist group in 1994, they wound up much more on the receiving end of violence during their struggle against the Mexican government and the forces of globalization. They are, in any case, not a terrorist group today.

4. The Sandinistas in Nicaragua

Much as the Zapatistas fashioned their name after a heroic national figure, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (*Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional*, FSLN) of Nicaragua chose its name after the charismatic Augusto César Sandino, who led a rebellion against the U.S. military in Nicaragua between 1927 and 1933. But where the Zapatistas failed to overthrow the government in power, the Sandinistas succeeded. Created in 1961 by a group of student activists in Managua, the Sandinistas removed President Anastasio (“Tachito”) Somoza Debayle by force in 1979, forcing him to flee to Guatemala, where he was assassinated the following year. The Sandinistas ruled Nicaragua for eleven years after taking power.

In their investigations of Nicaragua after the Sandinista revolution, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found clear evidence of acts of terrorism: mass graves (1981) and extensive human rights violations, including imprisonments without trial followed by disappearances (1983). Much of the evidence implicates the counter-revolutionary forces – the “Contras” – that the United States supported through CIA covert operations. Other findings implicate the Sandinistas, although both sides generally regard the evidence as unreliable. Either way, however, it would be a case of state-sponsored terrorism, and killings done by the Contras would be an example of what Martin (2006) calls the “patronage model” of state-sponsored terrorism, involving the use of proxy forces. To the extent that the United States was involved, it serves as a permanent stain on our good reputation throughout the region and the world.

C. Attacks in Europe and Russia

The 2001 terrorist attack on New York and Washington was an attack on the United States, but it was also a symbolic attack on the West generally. Europe had experienced terrorist attacks before 9/11, but the serious attacks that have occurred in Europe and Russia since 2001 are widely regarded as having larger significance, stimulated by the 9/11 attacks and the West’s response to the attack – they are perceived as tit-for-tat strikes, as a manifestation of the clash of civilizations frenzy. Or they may simply have been random events that would have occurred anyway. Let us examine three of these events in chronological order: terrorist attacks in Spain, Russia, and England.

1. March 2004 Madrid Commuter Train Attack

On March 11, 2004, exactly two and a half years (eerily, 911 days) after the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, a gang of militants who associated themselves with al Qaeda set off bombs, delivered in backpacks, on four commuter trains during the morning rush hour in Madrid, Spain. The attack killed nearly 200 people and seriously injured about 1,500 others, making it the deadliest attack in Europe since the Pan Am jetliner bombing in 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland. It occurred just days before the Spanish general election, and the government quickly – and erroneously – attributed the act to a Basque separatist group, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), the “Basque Fatherland and Liberty.” Forensic evidence soon implicated a cell of about a dozen Islamic terrorists from Morocco, four of whom blew themselves up three weeks after the attack when surrounded by police in the town of Leganes, about seven miles south of Madrid.

The commuter rail line that was attacked serves suburbs to the southeast of Madrid, a string of communities that are home to students, blue-collar

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workers, and others unable to pay for housing in the city, including middle-class immigrants from Latin America and Eastern Europe. About 150 of the dead were middle-class Spaniards. Fifteen of the people killed were Romanians, and most of the others were from Central and South America.

The attack offers a strong morality tale for politicians. The aim of terrorists is typically political, and the most prominent politician in Spain at the time of the attack, Prime Minister José María Aznar, could hardly have handled the Madrid attack worse than he did. He said on the day of the disastrous killings that he believed that ETA was responsible, despite lack of compelling evidence in support of the claim. It became clear within a matter of hours, however, that this was the act of a group loosely associated with al Qaeda. Aznar's standings in the polls plummeted immediately, and he and his party were swept out of power just three days after the bombings. It was of no small consequence that Aznar had made Spain one of the strongest supporters of the U.S. war operations in Iraq, and the new administration quickly withdrew its 1,300 troops and all other Spanish support of the war effort. Although the event itself did little to create sympathy for the causes of the perpetrators, the withdrawal of Spanish forces from Iraq soon after the election made this a clear victory for al Qaeda and the cause of international jihadi terrorism.

2. September 2004 Beslan School Hostage Crisis

The Beslan school hostage crisis ranks as one of the most heinous acts of terrorism in modern times. It targeted hundreds of children, killing 186 of them, and 148 adults as well, without a hint of mercy. It began on September 1, 2004, when a group of thirty-two armed Chechen separatists – thirty men and two women – took 1,200 children and adults hostage at a secondary school in North Ossetia-Alania, a semi-independent republic of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus region about 800 miles southeast of Moscow and 300 miles north of the Iranian border.

Although it is not certain who led the attack on the ground, it is clear that Shamil Salmanovich Basayev, leader of the Chechen separatist radicals, was behind it and probably masterminded it, along with his chief associate, Kamel Rabat Bouralha, an Algerian-born citizen of the United Kingdom. Basayev, who directed the 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis, took responsibility for the Beslan attack a few days after it ended. As an extreme Chechen separatist and Muslim radical, Basayev had a long-standing grievance against Russia and against Christians, and Beslan's predominantly Christian population provided an opportunity to strike at both.

One aspect of the attack that made it particularly heinous was that it was timed to occur on the first day of the Russian school year, when children are traditionally accompanied by their parents and relatives and first-year students bring flowers to the class of graduating students (Phillips, 2007)

The attackers wore camouflage battle fatigues and black ski masks; several carried machine guns and wore belts with explosives. They corralled the 1,200 hostages into the school gymnasium and ordered them to speak only Russian. When a father tried to calm the hostages and repeat the rules in the local language, a gunman stepped up and killed him with a bullet to the head. Soon afterward, the terrorists took about twenty of the most robust-looking men among the hostages to another room and mowed them down in a hail of machine-gun fire. Other hostages were forced to toss the bodies out of the building and clean the blood from the room.

To deter rescue attempts and escapes, the attackers immediately stripped the hostages of their cell phones. They then mined the gymnasium with explosive devices and surrounded it with trip wires, threatening to blow up the school if the police attacked. They also threatened to kill fifty hostages for every attacker killed by the police and twenty hostages for every attacker injured.

After a day of unsuccessful negotiations with Russian officials, the hostage-takers refused to allow food, water, or medicine to be brought in to the hostages or to allow the removal of the bodies from the school grounds. This, together with the extreme heat in the gym, created unbearable conditions for both the children and adults. Some lost consciousness. As the conditions grew increasingly dire, the hostage-takers became more and more edgy and unreasonable.

Finally, just a few hours into the third day of the crisis, explosions rang out, and there are several conflicting accounts of their cause and the sequence of events that followed. What is clear is that Russian security forces hit the building with heavy weapons – including flamethrowers and three tanks – and the bloody shootout that followed killed 344 civilians, most of them children. Hundreds of others were wounded, many suffering permanent injuries. Few ambulances had been brought to the school to move the injured to hospitals. The vast majority of the children are reported to have suffered profound emotional trauma (Lansford, 2007).

All of the thirty-two hostage-takers were killed in the battle that ended the siege, except for the prime instigator of the operation, Shamil Basayev. Basayev was killed in a truck explosion in 2006 in Ingushetia, a small republic along the northern border of Chechnya.

The Russian government's handling of the episode received sharp criticism from all sides. Three shortcomings of the Russian government's handling of the affair are significant. First, it is likely that a more skillful process of negotiation with the hostage-takers could have saved hundreds of lives. Second, the use of excessive force almost certainly resulted in the deaths of many more hostages. Finally, lack of transparency in reporting the events both during and after the siege produced deep cynicism and further mistrust of the government among the public; when Russian officials initially downplayed the

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incident and reported about one-third of the actual number of captives, the attackers took out their rage on the hostages (Phillips, 2007). Governments responsible for handling hostage crises everywhere, including those involving U.S. schools, should heed these lessons (Giduck, 2005).

3. July 2005 London Subway and Bus Attack

Most people found the 9/11 attack devastating, but for some young men it represented an exciting challenge, as it opened the door to further sensational acts of terror against the West. London was a particularly ripe target for disaffected, young men of Pakistani heritage who had been stimulated by extremists to participate in what would turn out to be for them the ultimate group adventure in jihadi terror.

During the rush hour on July 7, 2005, three bombs exploded on three different subway trains – within a period of less than a minute – in London's underground system. A fourth bomb went off less than an hour later on a double-decker bus at Tavistock Square; circumstantial evidence suggests that the bus bomber had improvised his attack after being turned away from the subway's Northern Line, which had been temporarily closed due to a mechanical breakdown. The four blasts killed fifty-six in all, including fifty-two commuters. Half of the commuter deaths occurred on a single train near the Russell Square station. The blast also injured about 700 other commuters, and it effectively shut down London for a day.

Although twice as many had been killed in the Madrid subway attack sixteen months earlier, this was the deadliest attack on London since World War II; the deadliest terrorist act in Britain since the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, which killed 270 people; and London's first suicide bombing attack.

The coordinated attack involving deadly suicide attacks on four separate vehicles was eerily reminiscent of the 9/11 attack nearly four years earlier. The London bombing was unique, however (as noted in an earlier footnote in this chapter), because it had elements of both domestic and international terrorism. The act was committed by three second-generation Pakistanis born in Britain and a Jamaican who had converted to Islam five years earlier. All four were radicalized in England; some were trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack on September 1 in a videotape aired over the al Jazeera network.

The investigation of the four bombing sites and the homes of the bombers was all encompassing, including conventional chemical and blast forensic analyses, analysis of footage of closed-circuit television surveillance videotapes from the train stations, and interviews of survivors and of people who knew the attackers. The bombs were determined to be homemade organic peroxide devices. The coordination of the attackers and the potency of their



From left to right, Hasib Hussain, Germaine Lindsay (carrying bag), Mohammad Sidique Khan, and Shehzad Tanweer entering the train station at Luton (approximately thirty miles north-northwest of London) on July 7, 2005, about ninety minutes before the three subway bombs exploded. Photo © Crown.

bombs suggested significant planning and probably external support, quite possibly from al Qaeda. The most significant lapse of the British law enforcement community occurred two weeks after the attack, when an innocent Brazilian worker erroneously thought to be a terrorist was killed by overly vigilant officers of the London Metropolitan Police Department (see Chapter 13, case study box).

The four attackers ranged in age from 18 to 30. Three lived in Leeds, about 160 miles north of London, and the fourth in Aylesbury, about 30 miles northwest of London. Two lived with their wives (both pregnant), one lived with his parents, and the fourth with his brother. None had prior criminal records. At least two were known to have traveled previously to Pakistan. The quartet appears to have been led by Mohammad Sidique Khan, the oldest member of the group.

D. ASIA

1. *Japanese Red Army*

Asians were not spared the phenomenon of left-wing students acting out as militant extremists in the 1960s and '70s, as they had in Europe, for example,

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Japanese Red Army founder Fusako Shigenobu.

in the form of the German Red Army Faction and the Italian Red Brigades (see Chapter 6) and in the United States with the Weather Underground (see the first section of this chapter). Japan, too, experienced its share of rebellious extremism perpetrated by students against the institutions and symbols of capitalist power. The settings and methods were similar to those in the West: demonstrations that became confrontational and then deadly, armed robberies to obtain financing while attacking institutions of capitalism, airplane hijackings, bombings, and assassinations.

The Japanese Red Army was formed in 1971, largely to bring down the Japanese monarchy and stimulate an international revolution – at about the same time its counterparts sprang up in the West. It was founded by Fusako Shigenobu, who was dissatisfied with the nonviolent methods used by the Red Army Faction of the Japanese Communist League – much as counterpart groups in Europe and the United States had splintered off from groups that discouraged the use of violence to achieve their goals.

Unlike its counterparts in the West, however, the Japanese Red Army conducted its most deadly operations outside the country. Most of its actions took place in the Middle East, where Shigenobu led members of her organization to take up the cause of the Palestinians in Lebanon and Palestine, working closely with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. One of the most sensational events in this collaboration was a 1972 attack that killed twenty-four people and injured about eighty others, described by Gus Martin as “a remarkable example of international terrorism in its purest form: Leftist Japanese terrorists killed Christian pilgrims from Puerto Rico

arriving on a U.S. airline at an Israeli airport on behalf of the nationalist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine" (2006, p. 288).

The Japanese Red Army also conducted acts of terrorism in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and Singapore during the 1970s and '80s. By the 1980s, the Japanese Red Army had, in fact, ended its operations altogether in Japan (Farrell, 1990).

After evading the criminal justice system for 25 years, Shigenobu was eventually arrested during a secret visit to Osaka in 2000. She was convicted in 2006 of kidnapping and attempted murder for a crime committed in the Netherlands in 1974 and received a sentence of twenty years.

2. *Aum Shinrikyo*

We noted in Chapter 5 that Aum Shiirikyo, a religious sect active in Japan in the early 1990s, was responsible for the sarin gas attack that killed a dozen people and injured thousands of others on a Tokyo subway in 1995. Aum Shinrikyo was formed by Shoko Asahara in 1984, announced its formal status in 1989, and grew to an organization with thousands of members in Japan and tens of thousands in other countries, predominantly Russia. (In a later section of this chapter we describe the organization's founder and leader, Shoko Asahara.) Aum Shinrikyo was, and still is, a classic cult organization, with its own system of beliefs derived from Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity, developed and promoted principally by its charismatic leader, Asahara.

Aum Shinrikyo's members have been generally well educated and separated into two distinct classes. The first comprises a corps of monks and nuns who live their lives as ascetics in monastic compounds in various regions of Japan, spending much of their time in meditation (much of it based on traditional yoga). The second is a much larger lay group of practitioners, most of whom lead secular lives. The organization is also divided horizontally according to a system of departments: medical, scientific, martial, and educational.

The ideology of Aum Shinrikyo is a blend of several notions, some spiritual and others more bizarre and dangerous. The spiritual side combines traditional yoga meditation with the idea of a perfect path to enlightenment. The more bizarre side includes a fantastic assortment of beliefs in space missions at the benign end, to international conspiracies, the need to accumulate weapons, and apocalypse at the other. These were not just dark dreams. The police recovered tons of chemicals and other weapons stockpiles at the time of Asahara's arrest, indicating that the organization had planned eventually to overthrow the Japanese government (Lifton, 2000).

The organization officially removed the apocalyptic elements of its ideology following Asahara's prison sentence in 1995, and it changed its name to "Aleph" in 2000. However, the National Police of Japan continue to monitor

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the organization. In 2005 they estimated its size at about 1,650 members, considerably smaller than before. Aum Shinrikyo remained on the U.S. State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations for years after he was imprisoned.

The Tokyo attack of 1995 revealed the extreme vulnerability of subway systems in most urban settings to chemical or biological terrorist attacks. In fact, members of Aum Shinrikyo had seriously considered using cyanide, a much more deadly gas than sarin, but chose sarin because it was more accessible in large quantities. Lessons learned: chemical or biological attacks are not difficult to plan and execute; many of the substances capable of inflicting great harm are readily available and inexpensive; and most cities are ill equipped to respond quickly and effectively to such attacks.

3. Jemaah Islamiyah and the Bali Bombings of 2002 and 2005

No nation in the world has as large a Muslim population as Indonesia – nearly 90 percent of its 250 million people are Muslims. There are another fifteen million Muslims in Malaysia, just to the north of Indonesia, and four million more in the Philippines to the northeast. Although the vast majority of these people live in peace, extremist factions are present in the area, as in most other parts of the world. The dominant and most deadly of the Islamic extremist groups in Southeast Asia has been Jemaah Islamiyah (“community of Islam”).

Jemaah Islamiyah was founded formally in Malaysia in 1993 by an Indonesian Muslim cleric in exile, Abu Bakar Bashir, and his associate, Abdullah Sungkar, an Islamic extremist from Yemen. They set out to create an organization that would work to consolidate all Muslims across Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Brunei into a single Islamic state in the region. The organization developed considerable momentum in 1998 with the fall of President Suharto from Indonesia, which allowed its founders to return to Indonesia and establish new headquarters there. Sungkar met with Osama bin Laden not long afterward, thereby aligning Jemaah Islamiyah with the al Qaeda organization. This alliance extended al Qaeda's global reach, gave Jemaah Islamiyah access to al Qaeda's substantial terrorist training and weaponry resources, and expanded recruitment opportunities for both organizations (Barton, 2003; Ressa, 2003). The organization went on to engage in terrorist activities on a modest scale in Maluku (the “Spice Islands”), Indonesia, and Singapore (Abuza, 2003).

Then, on October 12, 2002, Jemaah Islamiyah scored a major terrorist hit on the vacation center of Bali, an Indonesian island in the South Pacific just to the east of Java. Two suicide bombers from Jemaah Islamiyah killed more than 200 people there – 88 of them Australian – and injured many others at the Sari Club, a popular tourist nightspot. The larger of the two bombs was

an ammonium nitrate (fertilizer) device, exploded from a car, that left a deep crater. Most of those hospitalized from the bomb suffered severe burns.

Two weeks later, the United Nations put Jemaah Islamiyah on its list of terrorist organizations linked to al Qaeda or the Taliban.⁹ An Indonesian court convicted Abu Bakar Bashir on charges of conspiracy for his role in planning the 2002 Bali attack, for which he served a prison term of under twenty-six months (released in 2006). Three of Bashir's associates received death sentences, and a fourth a life term, for their more direct involvements in the crime.

Jemaah Islamiyah continued its terrorist activities after the Bali event. The organization was implicated in the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing in Kuningan, Jakarta; the 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta; and a second suicide bombing in Bali, in 2005, involving three suicide bombers who killed twenty people and injured more than one hundred others.

E. The Middle East

The 9/11 attack was committed by nineteen terrorists, all from countries in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Lebanon. We would do well to understand what is unique to the terrorism of this area both to understand terrorism more fully and to respond more effectively to the leading exporters of terrorism

1. Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda is perhaps the most dangerous terrorist threat facing the United States. It is also a threat to the entire Middle East: it was born in the wake of the Soviet flight from Afghanistan, at the far eastern boundary of the Middle East, and its roots are in the center of the Middle East.

Al Qaeda is a Sunni-Arab organization with several distinct enemies in the Middle East: Israel, which it considers a creation of Zionists working through the United Nations, in collaboration with the United States and Great Britain; the Saudi Arabia monarchy, which it regards as a corrupt collaborator with the United States; and Shi'ite Muslims, headquartered in Iran and with strongholds in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. It is dedicated to the removal of these and all other regimes that it characterizes as obstacles to al Qaeda's goal of creating a Sunni-Arab caliphate in the Middle East.

Because of the mayhem al Qaeda had caused in the Middle East and elsewhere even before the 9/11 attack, the United Nations formally declared al Qaeda a terrorist organization in 1999, under Resolution 1267. The resolution contains provisions to freeze al Qaeda's assets and those of its leaders, to restrict shipments of the organization's resources, and to limit the travel of its members. After the 9/11 attack several powerful nations – including the

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United States, Great Britain, Russia, Australia, and Japan – passed legislation identifying al Qaeda as a terrorist organization, adding further sanctions against the group and its members.

Following U.S. airstrikes and other military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, al Qaeda's leaders retreated to the mountains along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This area is largely in the Waziristan region of Pakistan, but the Pakistan government failed for years to seriously challenge them or to permit foreign military forces to do so. Al Qaeda continues to play an important role both as a supporter and coordinator of operations throughout the Middle East and as a model of inspiration to like-minded terrorists throughout the world.

2. Hezbollah

If al Qaeda is the premier Sunni network of jihadi terrorism, Hezbollah ("Party of God") is its Shi'ite counterpart. There are other large Shi'ite terrorist organizations, such as the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr, but none has had the territorial reach, organizational depth, or external support of Hezbollah.

A critical difference between al Qaeda and Hezbollah, apart from their basic Sunni-Shi'ite distinction, is that al Qaeda operates privately by individuals acting outside of, and against, nation-states, whereas Hezbollah has been, since 1985, a creation of Iran. Hezbollah's 1985 manifesto begins as follows:

We are the sons of the *ummah* (Muslim community) – the party of God (*Hizb Allah*) – the vanguard of which was made victorious by God in Iran. There the vanguard succeeded to lay down the bases of a Muslim state which plays a central role in the world. We obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and faqih (jurist) who fulfills all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini.

Hezbollah is thus designed to spread the law of Shi'ite Islam from Iran outward to the rest of the Middle East and beyond. Its acts of terrorism can be regarded as acts of Iranian state-sponsored terrorism.

Hezbollah first coalesced as an organization in 1982 – not in Iran, but in Lebanon, where a band of young Shi'ites were drawn to a charismatic cleric, Muhammad Hussayn Fadiallah. They were a disaffected group who felt oppressed by Sunni and Christian elites in Lebanon and by Israel's 1982 invasion of their country. They found solace and inspiration in the story of the Iranian Revolution, which replaced repressive anti-Islamic powers with what they regarded as pure Islamic leaders (Goldberg, 2002a; Raustorp, 1997).

By 1985, Iran's support of this band of young men became more than merely inspirational. Iran came to see in this fledgling group the makings of a pro-Iranian stronghold in the region. With Iran's active support, Hezbollah became a major innovator in using tactics of surprise in waging acts of terrorism, a model that al Qaeda would emulate. According to *New Yorker* essayist Jeffrey Goldberg,

Al Qaeda learned the value of choreographed violence from Hezbollah. The organization virtually invented the multipronged terror attack when, early on the morning of October 23, 1983, it synchronized the suicide bombings, in Beirut, of the United States Marine barracks and an apartment building housing a contingent of French peacekeepers. Those attacks occurred just twenty seconds apart; a third part of the plan, to destroy the compound of the Italian peacekeeping contingent, is said to have been jettisoned when the planners learned that the Italians were sleeping in tents, not in a high-rise building (2002a).

The two suicide truck bomb explosions caused unprecedented destruction. They leveled the four-story barracks that held the American military personnel, killing 242 Americans, mostly Marines. The other bomb killed fifty-eight French paratroopers and six Lebanese civilians. The entire multinational force was removed within less than a year. Thus, Hezbollah showed in 1983 that innovative tactics of terror used on a grand scale could force powerful Western governments to withdraw their military presence from Muslim lands.

Hezbollah also induced other groups to join in the cause of militant jihad against alien forces, often distancing themselves from terrorist attacks to make it difficult to trace their involvement and that of Iran (Taberi, 1987). These operations included suicide attacks against enemies in Lebanon, assassinations of public officials, and kidnappings and killings of foreigners.

Several leaders emerged in the Hezbollah organization to complement Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah's initial spiritual leadership. Abus Musawi – like Fadlallah, a Muslim cleric – emerged as the organization's leader in the late 1980s and early '90s. He was named Secretary General of Hezbollah in 1991. Musawi was known for his close ties to Iran's leadership. In November 1991, three months after Musawi declared that Hezbollah would wipe out every trace of Israel in Palestine and undermine the peace process, Israeli attack helicopters killed him, his wife, a son, and four others traveling in a motorcade in southern Lebanon.


Hassan Nasrallah replaced Musawi as Hezbollah's leader in 1992. Nasrallah was a natural heir to Musawi – he had distinguished himself as a fiery Shi'ite cleric, an early member of Hezbollah in 1982, and a Hezbollah militia leader in the 1980s. As Hezbollah's new leader, Nasrallah demonstrated

skill as a strategic-minded leader – organizing Shi'ite militia groups throughout Lebanon; building Hezbollah's arsenal of weapons; taking bolder, more effective action against Israeli military forces; strengthening ties with Syria; supporting Hamas, its Sunni counterpart in Palestine; expanding Hezbollah's international reach to Europe, Asia, and the Americas; and attempting to legitimize Hezbollah by involving it in Lebanon's political system. However, Nasrallah miscalculated how Israel would respond to Hezbollah's kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers in 2006. The Israeli military retaliated by killing hundreds of Hezbollah fighters and about 10,000 civilians, reducing much of southern Lebanon to rubble. Yet, Nasrallah managed to save face by launching missile attacks into Israel throughout the month-long battle, a feat that had never before been accomplished in the relatively short history of Arab battles against Israel.

Today, Hezbollah is a legitimate political party in Lebanon – albeit a small minority party – with members who have been elected to the parliament largely on the strength of Nasrallah's leadership and Hezbollah's social service programs (Goldberg, 2002a). This has given the party some standing, an antidote to its richly deserved terrorist label. Hezbollah also has a propaganda machine in the form of its al Manar satellite television station. At the same time, however, Hezbollah continues to commit terrorist acts throughout the world (Stephens, 2007). Moreover, its leaders continue to take uncompromising positions on Israel's right to survival (holding that it must be wiped out), on Lebanon's relations with Iran and Syria (they must be solidified), on whether accommodations can be made with Sunnis and Christians (they cannot), and on the promotion of suicide bombing as acts of martyrdom on its al Manar network – keeping the state of Lebanon in political gridlock (Goldberg, 2002a; Young, 2006).

3. *Palestinian Terrorist Groups*

Other extremist groups have engaged frequently in terrorist activities in the neighboring Palestine area and Israel, inflicting enormous damage on both places. In the twenty-first century, some of the most active are Hamas, the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The ultimate goal of these groups is the eradication of Israel – land that the groups believe rightfully belongs to Arabs. They see Israel as an artificial state imposed on them by Zionists in 1947 through the United Nations, at the behest of the United States and Great Britain, in the name of providing a sanctuary for Jews after the Holocaust. Palestinians argue that the Israelis have only added insult to injury by humiliating the Palestinian people through superior military power and economic and social oppression and by building settlements in Arab territories taken after the 1967 Six-Day War – on the West Bank, Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula,



1990 Intifada poster by Ayman Bardaweel.

the Golan Heights, and in East Jerusalem. The extremist groups give expression to those frustrations, which reflect both political opposition to the state of Israel and hatred of the Jews, through protest and acts of terrorism.

In response, Israelis hold that the Jewish people have lived peacefully alongside Arabs in the region for thousands of years, often in close friendship, and that they would be perfectly happy to see this situation return in a two-state solution, with Israel and Palestine coexisting as separate independent nations, living side by side in harmony. They argue that the sanctions they have imposed – making Israel into a fortress physically, economically, and socially – have been invoked only in self-defense; they have been needed to stem the rising tide of suicide bombers and mortar attacks from adjacent Arab lands, including lands given up as defense buffers along Israel's borders in 2006. They see their defense as an “existential” struggle, with Israel's very survival in the balance.

The process of developing a peaceful two-state solution to the problem has been supported not only by Palestinian moderates but also by many, if not most, neighboring Arab states and by most other nations throughout the world. Yet, the process of creating a “road map” to such a solution has been undermined repeatedly by extremists both in Israel and Palestine; and expressions of moderation have virtually disappeared. Even if an accord were reached, it is difficult to imagine how the moderates on either side could prevent the extremists in their communities from violating them. Still, even though prospects for a two-state solution have faded, moderates on both sides continue to cling to hope. A few point with optimism to the example of Fatah, which transformed itself from a terrorist faction of the secular Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) into a dominant political party that has expressed opposition to terrorism, hoping that others can follow suit.

The major Palestinian extremist groups that have engaged in acts of terrorism are profiled below.

Hamas. Hamas (an acronym for *Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya* or “Islamic Resistance Movement”) was created at the start of the first Intifada (a mass Palestinian uprising against Israel) in 1987 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin

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of the Gaza wing of the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood. The group started in the Jabalia refugee camp and spread quickly through Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, escalating its tactics from stone throwing and graffiti to the use of Molotov cocktails and grenades. Hamas's first suicide attack occurred in 1993. It then became an umbrella group that recruited and armed Palestinians to wage war against Israel. Individual cells that make up Hamas operate semi-autonomously. Over a three-and-a-half year period starting in November 2000, Hamas carried out an estimated 425 attacks against Israeli soldiers and citizens, killing 377 and injuring 2,076 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004).

Hamas may be following the path of Fatah, as it attempts to legitimize its standing. In 2005, it suddenly stopped committing suicide bombings (King and Bekker, 2006). The organization has turned from an emphasis on violence to the provision of health, education, and social services to Palestinians through a network of charities. In 2006, Hamas achieved a stunning political victory over the more moderate Fatah Party in winning 76 of the 132 available parliamentary seats in the Palestine parliament. A few months later, they were criticized for failing to renounce a suicide attack by the Islamic Jihad, an attack that killed nine people in Tel Aviv (King and Bekker, 2006). Time will tell whether Hamas will continue to moderate its violent, extremist legacy.

Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades were formed in the refugee camps of the West Bank in around 2001, after the second Intifada.¹⁰ Although the group is named after a mosque in East Jerusalem, it is more secular than religious. It is the militant arm of the Fatah Party, an offshoot of Yassir Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization. The al Aqsa Martyrs have made extensive use of suicide bombings. In 2002, the U.S. State Department put al Aqsa on its list of foreign terrorist organizations following an attack in Jerusalem that killed eleven people. Less than a year later, an al Aqsa bomber killed twenty-two people at a bus station in Tel Aviv. They have targeted Israeli buses and places with large congregations of people and have assassinated prominent moderate Palestinians and journalists.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a modest-sized group consisting of loosely associated factions. Like the other Palestinian terrorist groups, it is committed to the removal of Israel from Palestine. The group was created in the Gaza Strip in the 1970s by Fathi Shaqaqi, a Palestinian with close ties to the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Shaqaqi was a pioneer in justifying the use of suicide as a technique of jihad, writing in the 1970s that it was acceptable as a form of sacrifice in battle against the enemy. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad has claimed responsibility for several suicide attacks and other strikes against Israel over the years. Shaqaqi was assassinated in Malta in 1995 and was replaced as leader soon after by Sheikh Abdullah Ramadan Shallah. In 2006 Shallah was placed on the FBI's list of most-wanted terrorists.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. One of the oldest Palestinian terrorist groups is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). It differs from the other Palestinian terrorist groups in that it is secular – it is an Arab rather than a Muslim group. The PFLP is a small, Marxist-oriented terrorist organization created in 1967 by George Habash, a Palestinian Christian. Habash regarded his Palestinian Arab community as a downtrodden people who needed the infusion of an uplifting revolutionary spirit like that embodied by guerrilla Che Guevara to advance themselves (Cooley, 1973).

The PFLP is part of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) network, second in size only to Fatah. It has traditionally taken a stronger, more militant stand than Fatah against the two-state solution and has for decades engaged in numerous terrorist attacks, including airplane hijackings, fatal bombings, and the taking of hostages. Its most devastating attack was carried out in 1970, when it planted a bomb on a Swissair flight from Zurich to Tel Aviv, killing forty-seven people. The group has claimed responsibility for several suicide bombing attacks in Israel since 2002.

4. Libya

Libya, an oil-rich nation of some six million people, became a pioneer in state-sponsored terrorism in the twentieth century under its mercurial leader, Colonel Moammar Gaddafi, who seized power in 1969 after heading a bloodless military overthrow of King Idris. Gaddafi then set up what he saw as a revolutionary system of “Islamic socialism” in the 1970s, with clear designs on following in the footsteps of the Egyptian leader, Abdul Nasser, who had blazed a trail toward becoming the pan-Arabic leader in the 1960s until he was assassinated in 1970. Elements of Gaddafi’s model included Islamic restraint from excess (he banned alcohol and gambling), opposition to Western capitalism (he nationalized all large corporations), and the autocratic imposition of loyalty (he had dissidents assassinated, including five in 1980 who had escaped to Italy).

Central to Gaddafi’s grand design was the rejection and removal of Western influences, by whatever means available. In 1979, the U.S. embassy in Tripoli was burned and closed permanently. In 1981, the Libyan government created the People’s Committee for Students of Libyan Jamahariya, also known as the People’s Committee for Libyan Students (PCLS) – a front for Libyan intelligence and terrorist activities in the United States. Afterward, Gaddafi actively promoted terrorism by building terrorist training camps and weapons stockpiles in selected countries throughout the world. In 1986, Gaddafi directed two bombings that killed U.S. citizens: first, a TransWorld Airlines jetliner in Greece killing four Americans, and then the La Belle Disco – a favorite Berlin nightclub for U.S. servicemen stationed in Germany – killing one GI

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and injuring seventy-nine other Americans. The following year, a merchant ship carrying about 150 tons of Libyan weapons was intercepted in the Bay of Biscay, off the north coast of Spain.

The most sensational of all Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks was the 1988 bombing of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, which killed 270 people, including 189 Americans. The jet, carrying 259 passengers from twenty-one countries (11 Scottish citizens were killed on the ground), was en route from London's Heathrow International Airport to New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport four days before Christmas. A three-year investigation resulted in the eventual conviction of two Libyans: an intelligence officer who headed security for Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA) and the LAA station manager in Malta, the jet's previous departure point.

An even greater threat of state-sponsored terrorism by Libya was averted in 2003, when it was revealed that the Libyan government had invested some \$300 million in the development of a nuclear weapons program, with assistance from Pakistan's Abdul Qadeer Khan. The program was dismantled soon afterward (Miller, 2006).

Effective intelligence was key in the response to Gaddafi's state-sponsored terrorism. The interception by U.S. intelligence of a 1986 Telex communication from Tripoli to the Libyan embassy in East Germany exposed Libya's hand in the bombing of the La Belle Disco. The strength of the evidence against Libyans in the Lockerbie disaster and intervention by the United Nations led to Gaddafi's handing over the prime suspects to the Scottish police in 1999 and agreeing to pay \$2.7 billion to the families of the victims – \$10 million each – plus millions more to compensate families of earlier victims of Libya's terrorist attacks (Miller, 2006).

Gaddafi's ventures into the world of terrorism subsided throughout the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the exposure of his role in the global spread of terrorism. He was among the first world leaders to publicly condemn the 9/11 attack. His conversion from exporter of terrorism to responsible international leader was almost complete in 2003 – Benjamin Barber (2007) calls it a transformation from “implacable despot” to “complex and adaptive thinker” – with two important developments: the U.S. removal from power of another dangerous despot, Iraq's Saddam Hussein, and U.S. intelligence that exposed Libya's nuclear weapons program through the interception and recording of telephone conversations between the head of the program and A. Q. Khan (Miller, 2006). Since then, Gaddafi has become friendly with the West. This shift to a more open and peaceful direction for his country's international affairs may be due partly to the man and partly to his people, but surely no less to the effective mix of hard power and diplomacy (see Box 8.3).

Policy Box 8.3. Libya – A Hard Power Success Story?

One of the apparent success stories in the use of hard power against terrorism is U.S. intervention against Libya over a period of two decades, starting in 1982. In that year, the United States banned the import of Libyan oil and the export of technology that could have helped Libya's burgeoning oil industry, following a series of belligerent acts by the country's leader, Moammar Gaddafi – including explicit threats to send hit men to the United States to assassinate then-President Ronald Reagan. Then, in 1986 the United States banned all private commerce with Libya, including all-travel to or from the country.

Later that year – and just a few weeks after the 1986 Libyan bombing of a German disco that killed an American serviceman in Berlin – U.S. Air Force and Navy jets attacked Gaddafi's headquarters and other targets in Tripoli and Benghazi in "Operation El Dorado Canyon," killing about 100 Libyan military and government officials and destroying much valuable property. The attack also killed Gaddafi's adopted infant daughter and injured two of his sons.

In 2007 Gaddafi released the "Benghazi Six" – a Palestinian intern and five Bulgarian nurses – who had been falsely accused of conspiring to intentionally infect hundreds of Libyan children with HIV in 1998 and had received a death sentence and spent eight years in custody. Soon afterward, the United States removed Libya from its list of states that sponsor terrorism and restored full diplomatic relations with the country.

Gaddafi's conversion from terrorism to a member in good standing of the international community may have been stimulated by a variety of factors other than the use of U.S. sanctions, force, the threat of much greater force, and diplomacy – including negotiations to remove the sanctions and the promise not to overthrow him in return for an end to his involvement in terrorism. It may have been the product of his complex personality, the wisdom that comes with age and experience, the influence of his bright son, Saif al-Islam, a population that is more moderate than those in other Muslim nations, and other factors. He most certainly did not care to have it appear – especially among the international Arab-Muslim community he had once hoped to lead – that he was cowed into submission by the United States (Barber, 2007; Miller, 2006).

But the fact that he volunteered to abandon his nuclear weapons program and renounce terrorism soon after the United States removed Saddam Hussein from power and gave Gaddafi a CD with the recorded intelligence "goods" about his nuclear weapons program strongly suggests that hard power can be effective when applied with skill, under the right conditions, and in combination with diplomacy.

F. Prominent Contemporary Terrorist Leaders

Ideas are powerful, but perhaps even more persuasive are the charismatic spokesmen who deliver them. According to Fawaz Gerges, a scholar on violent Muslim extremists (whom he refers to as “jihadis”),

In my conversations with former jihadis, one of the critical lessons I have learned is that personalities, not ideas or organizations, are the drivers behind the movement. . . . The most lethal and violent jihadist factions and cells were led by highly charismatic, aggressive, and daring personalities who captivated and inspired followers to unquestionably do their bidding.

In earlier chapters, we profiled men, and one woman, who created and led terrorist organizations. Let us continue this examination with a closer look at some of the more prominent leaders of terrorist organizations.

Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden is generally regarded as the person most responsible for moving the world out of the post-Cold War era and into the era of terrorism. Although not involved in the detailed planning and execution of the attack of September 11, 2001, as the leader of al Qaeda he was the inspiration behind the attacks, and he provided financial and logistical support for them and for several serious terrorist attacks that preceded the 9/11 attack: the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center; the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi; the 2000 *USS Cole* bombing; the Bali nightclub bombings; and bombings in the Jordanian capital of Amman and in Egypt’s Sinai peninsula.

Lawrence Wright (2006a) sees bin Laden as the dominant figure in the sharp escalation of conflict between the West and the Arab Muslim world:

One can ask, at this point, whether 9/11 or some similar tragedy might have happened without bin Laden to steer it. The answer is certainly not. Indeed, the tectonic plates of history were shifting, promoting a period of conflict between the West and the Arab Muslim world; however, the charisma and vision of a few individuals shaped the nature of this contest. . . . At a time when there were many Islamist movements, all of them concentrated on nationalist goals, it was bin Laden’s vision to create an international jihad corps. It was his leadership that held together an organization that had been bankrupted and thrown into exile. It was bin Laden’s tenacity that made him deaf to the moral quarrels that attended the murder of so many and indifferent to the repeated failures that would have destroyed most men’s dreams. All of these were qualities that one can ascribe to a cult leader or a madman. But there was also artistry involved, not only to achieve the spectacular effect but also to enlist the imagination of the men whose lives bin Laden required (pp. 331–32).



Osama bin Laden.

Bin Laden was born in 1957 into a Saudi family that had become extremely wealthy in the construction industry. He earned degrees in civil engineering and public administration at King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, but received his more significant extracurricular education from individual professors there – most notably Muhammad Qutb (younger brother of Sayyid Qutb) and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, who introduced him to the Muslim Brotherhood and the anti-Western jihadist writings of Sayyid Qutb. In 1984 bin Laden worked with Azzam to help finance and organize the grassroots anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan (Wright, 2006a).

In the 1990s, bin Laden turned his energies to the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy, following his strong opposition to its alignment with the United States after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. The Saudi government responded by expelling bin Laden to the Sudan in 1991, and in 1995 stripping him of his citizenship after he claimed responsibility for directing attacks on U.S. and Saudi military bases in Riyadh and Dahran. Stimulated by the transnational designs of his associate, Ayman Zawahiri (see below), bin Laden shifted focus from “near enemy” targets in the Middle East to “far enemy” targets from Africa to the United States (Gerges). In Sudan, and later in Afghanistan, bin Laden set up camps to train Islamist militants in the use of firearms and explosives. In 1996, he fled Sudan for Afghanistan, after the Saudi and U.S. governments pressured Sudan into expelling him from that country. In Afghanistan, bin Laden developed a close relationship with Mullah Mohammed Omar and leaders of the Taliban government. In return for financial and paramilitary support of the Taliban, bin Laden was granted sanctuary and a command post from which he could direct worldwide jihadist operations, including the 1997 Luxor massacre in Egypt and the 9/11 attack.

In inspiring others to commit themselves to his cause in an extremely public manner, bin Laden has left a long trail of evidence implicating him in terrorist attacks (see Box 8.4 showing some of his famous remarks made over several years). Videotapes of bin Laden reveling in the collapse of the World Trade Center towers and acknowledging that they were acts of al Qaeda provide

Box 8.4. Thoughts of Osama Bin Laden: 1995–2003

On fighting Russians and Americans:

To counter these atheist Russians, the Saudis chose me as their representative in Afghanistan. . . . I did not fight against the communist threat while forgetting the peril from the West. . . . For us, the idea was not to get involved more than necessary in the fight against the Russians, which was the business of the Americans, but rather to show our solidarity with our Islamist brothers. I discovered that it was not enough to fight in Afghanistan, but that we had to fight on all fronts against communist or Western oppression. The urgent thing was communism, but the next target was America. . . . This is an open war up to the end, until victory.

~ Interview with a French journalist, April 1995

Declaration of war against Americans occupying holy lands:

(Our) youths know that their rewards in fighting you, the USA, is double their rewards in fighting someone else not from the people of the Bible. They have no intention except to enter paradise by killing you. . . . Terrorizing you, while you carry arms on our land, is a legitimate and morally demanded duty. It is a legitimate right well known to all humans and other creatures. Your example and our example is like a snake which entered into a house of a man and got killed by him. The coward is the one who lets you walk, while carrying arms, freely on his land and provides you with peace and security. . . . Those youths are different from your soldiers. Your problem will be how to convince your troops to fight, while our problem will be how to restrain our youths to wait for their turn in fighting and in operations. These youths are worthy of commendation and praise. They stood up tall to defend the religion, at the time when the government misled the prominent scholars and tricked them into issuing Fatwas, which have no basis either in the book of Allah or in the Sunnah of the Prophet (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him), for opening the land of the two Holy Places for the Christians armies and handing the Al-Aqsa Mosque to the Zionists. Twisting the meanings of the holy text will not change this fact.

~ Fatwa issued from the Hindukush Mountains, Afghanistan,
August 23, 1996

On why it was necessary to strike the United States and its allies:

The call to wage war against America was made because America has spearheaded the crusade against the Islamic nation, sending tens of thousands of its troops to the land of the two Holy Mosques over and above its meddling in its affairs and its politics, and its support of the oppressive, corrupt and tyrannical regime that is in control. These are the reasons behind the singling out of America as a target. And not exempt of responsibility are those Western regimes whose presence in the region offers support to the American troops there.

~ Interview with *Frontline*, May 1998

In response to a question about whether al Qaeda was responsible for the bombing of two embassies in Eastern Africa:

If the instigation for jihad against the Jews and the Americans in order to liberate al-Aksa Mosque and the Holy Kaaba (Islamic shrines in Jerusalem and Saudi Arabia) is considered a crime, then let history be a witness that I am a criminal. Our job is to instigate and, by the grace of God, we did that, and certain people responded to this instigation.

~ Interview with *Time* magazine, December 23, 1998

In response to the question, "What can the U.S. expect from you now?"

Any thief or criminal or robber who enters another country in order to steal should expect to be exposed to murder at any time. For the American forces to expect anything from me personally reflects a very narrow perception. Thousands of millions of Muslims are angry. The Americans should expect reactions from the Muslim world that are proportionate to the injustice they inflict.

~ Interview with *Time* magazine, December 23, 1998

In response to a question about whether he is trying to acquire nuclear weapons:

Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.

~ Interview with *Time* magazine, December 23, 1998

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On a U.S. plan to divide the Iraq into three parts:

These days, there is also a plan to divide Iraq into three – one in the north for Muslim kurds, a state in the middle, and a third in the south. The same applies to the land of the two mosques (Saudi Arabia) where there is a plan to divide it into a state for the two mosques, another state for oil in the eastern region, and a state in the middle. This would make the people of the two mosques always busy trying to earn a living, and would leave a few people in the oil region who can be easily controlled. This is a world design and Muslims should not focus on side effects. They should unify their ranks to be able to resist this occupation.

~ Interview with ABC, January 2, 1999

On the invasion of Afghanistan as a continuation of the Crusades:

Let us investigate whether this war against Afghanistan that broke out a few days ago is a single and unique one or if it is a link to a long series of crusader wars against the Islamic world. Following World War I, which ended more than eighty-three years ago, the whole Islamic world fell under the crusader banner – under the British, French, and Italian governments. They divided the whole world, and Palestine was occupied by the British.

~ "Bin Laden Rails against Crusaders and UN," *BBC News*,
November 3, 2001

On viewing a videotape of the collapse of the World Trade Towers:

We calculated in advance the number of casualties from the enemy, who would be killed based on the position of the tower. We calculated that the floors that would be hit would be three or four floors. . . . Due to my experience in this field, I was thinking that the fire from the fuel in the plane would melt the iron structure of the building and collapse the area where the plane hit and just the floors above it. This is all that we had hoped for. . . . The brothers who conducted the operation, all they knew was that they had a martyrdom operation and we asked each of them to go to America, but they didn't know anything about the operation, not even one letter. But they were trained, and we did not reveal the operation to them until just before they boarded the planes.

~ Transcript of videotape dated November 9, 2001,
released by the Pentagon in December 2001

On the United Nations:

Are not our tragedies but caused by the United Nations? Who issued the Partition Resolution on Palestine in 1947 and surrendered the land of Muslims to the Jews? It was the United Nations in its resolution in 1947. . . . This is the United Nations from which we have suffered greatly. Under no circumstances should any Muslim or sane person resort to the United Nations. The United Nations is nothing but a tool of crime. We are being massacred everyday, while the United Nations continues to sit idly by.

~ "Bin Laden Rails against Crusaders and UN," *BBC News*,
November 3, 2001

On the vulnerability of the United States:

America is a great power possessed of tremendous military might and a wide-ranging economy, but all this is built on an unstable foundation which can be targeted, with special attention to its obvious weak spots. If America is hit in one hundredth of these weak spots, God willing, it will stumble, wither away and relinquish world leadership.

~ Sermon, Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI)
(March 5, 2003), quoted in Pape (2005), p. 123

His appeal to disgruntled Americans and encouragement for them to convert to Islam:

Iraq and Afghanistan and their tragedies; and the reeling of many of you under the burden of interest-related debts, insane taxes and real estate mortgages; global warming and its woes; and the abject poverty and tragic hunger in Africa; all of this is but one side of the grim face of this global system. . . . To conclude, I invite you to embrace Islam, for the greatest mistake one can make in this world and one which is uncorrectable is to die . . . outside of Islam.

~ Transcript of videotape released for the sixth anniversary of 9/11
(September 11, 2007)

compelling evidence of his role in supporting, if not being closely involved in planning, the attack on the United States. His exhortations to resist the new American "Crusaders" may sound like absurd rhetoric to Western ears, but such words resonate deeply with millions of pious Muslims around the world who feel besieged by Western culture and values (Ahmed, 2003).

The FBI put bin Laden on its most-wanted list in 1998, and after the 9/11 attack, the U.S. government offered a reward of \$25 million for his capture.



Ayman al-Zawahiri

Speculation has swirled for years over the precise whereabouts of bin Laden, with many of the opinion that he lives somewhere in the vicinity of the long, rugged Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Others have questioned whether he is still alive.

Osama bin Laden's message has continually changed as his targets have shifted and expanded. His later messages point clearly to his intention to solidify his legacy as inspirational leader of the transformation of the world to his brand of Islam (Applebaum, 2007; Aslan, 2007).

Ayman Muhammad Rabaie al-Zawahiri. Ayman Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's chief associate, was born in 1951 to a family of professionals in Egypt. He became fluent in Arabic, French, and English; studied medicine; and earned a certificate in surgery. Whereas bin Laden came to the Salafist ideology through his education in Wahhabi schools in Saudi Arabia, Zawahiri joined the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt at age fourteen (Esposito, 2002, pp. 5, 18). In 1966, Zawahiri's radicalism was deepened by the execution of one of his heroes, Salafist leader Sayyid Qutb; it was accelerated fifteen years later by his imprisonment and torture in Egypt – much in the same manner in which Qutb had been imprisoned and tortured earlier – as a conspirator in the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. According to Lawrence Wright, “One line of thinking proposes that America's tragedy on September 11 was born in the prisons of Egypt” (2006a, p. 52).

Zawahiri was a near-perfect match with bin Laden as co-leader of the al Qaeda organization. They had common backgrounds and interests. Like bin Laden, Zawahiri was educated, Arab, and an Islamic extremist. Like bin

Laden, he had become radicalized by political powers who rejected him in his home country. And he had needs and skills that complemented bin Laden's well. Wright describes Zawahiri and bin Laden as near-perfect complements: "Zawahiri wanted money and contacts, which bin Laden had in abundance. Bin Laden, an idealist given to causes, sought direction; Zawahiri, a seasoned propagandist, supplied it" (2006a, p. 127). This was genuine symbiosis:

The dynamic of the two men's relationship made Zawahiri and bin Laden into people they would never have been individually; moreover, the organization they would create, al-Qaeda, would be a vector of these two forces, one Egyptian and one Saudi. Each would have to compromise in order to accommodate the goals of the other; as a result, al-Qaeda would take a unique path, that of global jihad (Wright, 2006a, p. 127; a similar assessment is offered by Gerges).

Wright (2006b) elaborates on the complementary inside role that Zawahiri played alongside bin Laden's al Qaeda: he was the strategist, ideologue, and detail-oriented schemer to bin Laden's charismatic dreamer. Zawahiri outlined a four-part plan for al Qaeda in a 2005 letter to the organization's field marshal, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (described below).

The first stage: Expel the Americans from Iraq. The second stage: Establish an Islamic authority or emirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate. . . . The third stage: Extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq. The fourth stage: It may coincide with what came before -- the clash with Israel, because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity.

One of Zawahiri's (2001) overarching themes has been the need for Muslim unity to achieve individual and collective goals:

The struggle for the establishment of the Muslim state cannot be launched as a regional struggle. . . . The jihad movement must realize that half the road to victory is attained through its unity. . . . The movement must seek this unity as soon as possible if it is serious in its quest for victory.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. One of Osama bin Laden's most important associates was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. If bin Laden was the spiritual leader of al Qaeda, Zarqawi was its field general in Iraq, al Qaeda's main battlefield after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Born in Jordan in 1966, Zarqawi was a tough high-school dropout who migrated to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets in 1989. In 1992 he was imprisoned for five years in Jordan for conspiracy to replace the Jordanian monarchy with an Islamic caliphate. After his release from prison, he traveled to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq. Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi led a substantial force of insurrectionists from neighboring Middle Eastern countries to wage jihad against the U.S. military forces in Iraq and against all others who supported attempts

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Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

to bring stability and democracy to the country. His aim was to divide the Iraqis and move them away from sectarian order. Most of his victims were Iraqi Shi'a. As documented in video and audiotapes, Zarqawi took personal responsibility and pride in executing kidnapped hostages, selecting targets for suicide bombings, and killing thousands of civilians, soldiers, and police officers in Iraq. He personally decapitated three Americans: Eugene "Jack" Armstrong, Nicholas Berg, and Jack Hensley (Whitlock, 2004). In 2005, the prominent Muslim newspaper *al Jazeera* reported that Zarqawi declared "all-out war" on Shia Muslims in Iraq. He is widely held responsible for enraging Iraqi Shi'a by directing the bombing of the sacred Askariya mosque in Samarra in 2006 and for losing support for the jihadist cause following the 2005 bombing of a wedding party at a hotel in Amman, Jordan (see Chapter 2).

Essayist and author George Will characterizes Zarqawi as a "pornographer of violence." Will elaborates as follows:

He was a primitive who understood the wired world and used an emblem of modernity, the Internet, to luxuriate in gore. But although he may have had an almost erotic enjoyment of the gore, it was also in the service of an audacious plan. And he executed it with such brutal efficiency that he became, arguably, the most effective terrorist in history.



Nassar

Although Zarqawi shared many jihadist goals with bin Laden and received financial support from him, Zarqawi was reported to be at sharp odds with bin Laden (Whitlock, 2004) and Ayman Zawahiri over methods used to achieve the goals of jihad. Zawahiri characterized these techniques as “unpalatable” at a time when “we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our *ummah*” (Ignatius, 2005b). An official alliance between Zarqawi’s group and al Qaeda was announced in 2004 in an audiotape in which bin Laden called Zarqawi “the emir (prince or commander) of al Qaeda in Iraq” and praised him for “his good deeds.” As with bin Laden, the U.S. government offered a \$25 million reward for information leading to Zarqawi’s death or capture. Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. airstrike on June 7, 2006, near the Iraq city of Baquba.

Mustafa Setmariam Nasar. Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, who also goes by the name of Abu Musab al-Asuri and is widely referred to simply as “Setmariam,” is a leading jihadi strategist. He is often singled out as the mastermind of the terrorist attacks on public transportation systems in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. Born in Syria in 1958, he fought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s, where he became an associate of Osama bin Laden. Setmariam later lived in Spain, where he married, became a citizen, and fathered two children. In 1995 he moved to London, and in 1998 to Afghanistan, where he collaborated with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and led a terrorist training camp (Cruikshank and Ali, 2006; Whitlock, 2004).

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Perhaps Setmariam's greatest impact on terrorism is his manifesto, *The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance*, issued on the Internet in December 2004. This document called for global conflict on as many fronts as possible – waged by small cells or individuals acting autonomously, rather than through traditional guerrilla warfare tactics based on cells coordinated closely with larger organizations. Setmariam's manifesto also emphasizes the use of the most deadly weapons possible to produce maximum destruction of the enemy.

In November 2005 Setmariam was captured in Quetta, Pakistan, by Pakistani police and turned over to U.S. authorities (Whitlock, 2006).

Shoko Asahara. Shoko Asahara was the founder and leader of the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, and the mastermind of the Tokyo subway attack in 1995 that killed twelve people and injured thousands of others. Born Chizuo Matsumoto in 1955, Asahara had a history of delinquency and criminality, starting as a bully at a boarding school for the blind (he was blind in one eye due to glaucoma) and advancing later to crimes of fraud and theft. In 1987 he formed Aum Shinrikyo, a quasi-religious cult that combined elements of conventional Eastern religions, including Hinduism and Buddhism, with apocalyptic notions of Christianity. Asahara wrote several books, including *Beyond Life and Death* in 1993. Inspired by his visions of violence, he learned about chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and gathered large quantities of sarin and other deadly chemicals for planned attacks in Japan and the United States (Cameron, 1999; Kaplan and Marshall, 1996; Kristof, 1997; Lifton, 2000; Rosenau, 2001). He planned and carried out a sarin attack on an apartment complex in the central Japanese city of Matsumoto in 1994, killing eight people and injuring over two hundred others (Kaplan and Marshall, 1996). Asahara was convicted on thirteen counts of murder and sentenced to death by hanging in 2004.

G. Commonalities and Differences

Terrorism manifests differently from place to place, and where successive acts of terrorism have occurred in a particular place, they tend to vary over time in both severity and nature. Each terrorist group has its own unique history and characteristics. Each arises out of a unique cultural heritage, with a specific set of political, religious, ethnic, or tribal grievances against others. Terrorist groups typically are formed by charismatic leaders who are effective in enlisting others in their causes, usually persuading their followers that the mission is unique and of paramount importance. These are usually fascinating stories, often too bizarre to pass as plausible fiction. But the stories are real, and they have imposed incalculable harm and grief on their immediate targets and on others.

Most of the stories have factors in common. The followers are usually impressionable young men who have no strong stake in conforming to norms of civility or to peaceful virtues. Except for the lone wolves, they typically develop strong ties of camaraderie with others committed to the cause. The most committed followers are typically obsessed with hatred of the group targeted. Their leaders appear to be committed largely to the expansion of power and influence.

Interventions against terrorist groups, if they are to succeed, must account for both the commonalities and the uniqueness of each group. Some groups are more likely than others to collapse if the leader is taken out. Some are more inclined to simply disappear, self-destruct, or be destroyed privately when ignored by government. Some are more likely than others to be susceptible to inducements to replace their hostile intentions with prospects for a positive future. In the next chapter we focus on responses that have been found to work – or not to work – against various types of terrorist groups.

Discussion Questions

1. Has terrorism in the United States been fundamentally different from terrorism in other places? In what way(s)? In what ways has it been like terrorism in other countries?
2. How has the mix of home-grown and cross-national terrorist events differed from country to country? How do you explain the differences? The similarities?
3. What traits appear to be fairly commonly shared among leaders of terrorist organizations? What traits appear to make some leaders more effective than others?
4. What are the primary differences between the U.S. war on terror during the years 2001 through 2008 and al Qaeda's Management of Savagery doctrine? Are the two programs comparable? Which do you think was more effective over this period? Explain your answers to the last two questions.
5. What changes in terrorism before and after 9/11 strike you as the most significant? Might some of these changes have occurred in the absence of 9/11? Which ones? Might some not have occurred? Which ones? Explain your answers.
6. What strikes you as the most important lessons for policymakers from the terrorist events of the past thirty years? How has the public debate on terrorism dealt with these matters? What is needed to improve the quality of this ongoing debate?