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Source: *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 1, Presidential Doctrines (Mar., 2006), pp. 48-58

Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552746>

Accessed: 17-09-2016 00:57 UTC

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# The Johnson Doctrine

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*In May 1965, when U.S. troops landed in the Dominican Republic, President Lyndon Johnson pronounced his "Johnson Doctrine," declaring that the United States would never again permit the establishment of a Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere. Although the Dominican intervention marked the first armed, overt U.S. intervention in Latin America in over three decades, the intervention and the Johnson Doctrine did not mark a signal departure in inter-American relations. Since the late nineteenth century, the United States has maintained a sphere of influence within the Western Hemisphere, exercising predominant influence in the region and limiting the freedom of action of Latin American nations.*

As over 20,000 combat-ready U.S. troops landed in the Dominican Republic in late April and early May of 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson explained in a televised broadcast that "the American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere."<sup>1</sup> In his May 2, 1965 address to the nation, the president pronounced his Johnson Doctrine—the United States would act to block a Communist takeover of a Latin American republic. President Johnson had seemingly established a new and sweeping principle of U.S. foreign policy. The containment and defeat of the international Communist movement mattered more than adhering to the legal niceties of hemispheric affairs. Although Johnson emphasized the multilateral nature of the concern about communism in the Dominican Republic, the invasion was a unilateral action. The United States justified its decision to the Organization of American States (OAS) after military action had begun. The military intervention violated Article 15 of the charter of the OAS (1948), which prohibited any state from intervening "directly, or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state." The invasion also violated

1. U.S. General Services Administration, *Public Papers of the President: Lyndon Baines Johnson, 1965* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1966), 469-74.

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the nonintervention pledge that had been the fundamental component of the Good Neighbor policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt. And the invasion undermined the hemispheric partnership envisioned in President John F. Kennedy's socioeconomic development program, the Alliance for Progress (Rabe 1985, 95).

Although the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic represented the first overt U.S. military intervention in a Latin American nation in over thirty years, neither the intervention nor the pronouncement of the Johnson Doctrine marked a signal departure in the history of inter-American relations. Since the late nineteenth century, the United States has maintained a sphere of influence within the Western Hemisphere, for it has exercised predominant influence in the region and limited the freedom of action of Latin American nations. The United States has tried to maintain peace and order, exclude foreign (European) influences, expand U.S. trade and investment, and shape Latin America's development. The Johnson Doctrine easily falls within the parameters of those traditional regional objectives.

Modern U.S. policy toward Latin America can be divided into five distinct periods. From 1895 to 1901, the United States established its supremacy or hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. From 1901 to 1933, under the aegis of the Platt Amendment (1901) and the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1904), the United States repeatedly intervened militarily in the affairs of Mexico and Caribbean and Central American nations. From 1933 to 1945, with its Good Neighbor policy, the United States renounced the right of intervention in Latin America but expected Latin Americans to accept U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States interpreted its relations with its southern neighbors through the prism of the Cold War and the U.S. confrontation with the Soviet Union. Since 1989-1991, in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. policy makers have worried less about foreign influences in the Western Hemisphere and focused on issues such as trade, immigration, and the illegal narcotics trade.

Historians point to the Venezuelan Boundary Crisis of 1895 as the beginning of the modern history of U.S. relations with Latin America. The United States demanded that the United Kingdom, the world's preeminent power, submit to binding arbitration the disputed boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana. The resolution of the long-standing boundary dispute gave Venezuela control over the mouth of the Orinoco River. But the Grover Cleveland administration did not act on behalf of Venezuela. The United States, now a dynamic industrial power, wanted to force the United Kingdom to accept U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. In a strident ultimatum sent to London, Secretary of State Richard Olney boasted that the United States "was practically sovereign on this continent." In acceding to U.S. demands, British officials conceded that the United States had replaced the United Kingdom as the dominant power in the region. The British concession also signified that the United States would exclusively operate a projected sea canal that would connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans (Gilderhus 2000, 11-13; Schoultz 1998, 107-24).

Immediately after the Cleveland administration's victory in the boundary crisis, the William McKinley administration made good on the claim that the United States had sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere. In the War of 1898, the United

States handily defeated Spain and secured Cuba's independence. But Cubans paid a price for the U.S. aid. The United States forced Cuba to attach to its new constitution the Platt Amendment, which gave the United States the right to intervene in Cuba's internal affairs. In addition, the United States annexed Guantánamo Bay and the island of Puerto Rico (Pérez 1998, 23-56). President Theodore Roosevelt followed this by successfully detaching the province of Panama from Colombia in 1903. The United States immediately secured a treaty with Panama giving the United States the right to build, operate, and fortify the Panama Canal. By 1904, the United States had established an overwhelming presence in the Caribbean area (LaFeber 1989, 23-45).

Expanding the principle inherent in the Platt Amendment, President Roosevelt issued his momentous Roosevelt Corollary in late 1904. Roosevelt declared that the United States would hereafter exercise "international police power" in the region. The United States demanded security and stability in the Caribbean, because it wanted to protect the canal, which would open in 1914, and guarantee the growing U.S. investments and trade with countries such as Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Between 1901 and 1933, the United States would conduct thirty-five armed interventions in the circum-Caribbean region. In particular, President Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) authorized several interventions. U.S. marines would rule Cuba, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. These repeated interventions also had the effect of sharply reducing British, French, and German influence in the region (Pérez 1982, 165-94). The U.S. presence also grew in South America, as U.S. investors began to extract Venezuelan oil and mine Chilean copper.

The repeated U.S. military interventions incensed Latin Americans. Led by Argentina and El Salvador, Latin American delegations denounced U.S. policies at inter-American meetings such as the Havana Conference (1928). U.S. investments were also threatened by the Latin American nationalism engendered by the economic depression of the 1930s. The U.S. response, as articulated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, was the Good Neighbor policy. At inter-American conferences, U.S. representatives repudiated the Roosevelt Corollary and pledged never again to intervene in the internal affairs of a Latin American nation. The United States also tried to revivify trade with Latin America through the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (1934) and began to assist Brazil's industrialization through economic aid. In turn, Latin America supported the United States during World War II, supplying vital raw materials and foodstuffs. Brazil and Mexico contributed military forces to the Allied cause (Wood 1961, 119-61, 327-61).

The Franklin Roosevelt years were seemingly happy years in the history of inter-American relations, suggesting that the United States had adopted a policy of "principled action." In the words of Bryce Wood, the historian of the Good Neighbor policy, "It was 'principled action,' because the United States not only renounced intervention and interference in domestic politics, but it actually did not intervene or interfere" (Wood 1985, ix-xiv). Being a good neighbor presumably meant conducting cordial relations with notorious dictators such as Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, and Anastasio Somoza García of Nicaragua. These tyrants enthusiastically supported U.S. policies during World War II. As Wood concedes, the Good

Neighbor policy involved the concept of “reciprocity.” The Roosevelt administration expected Latin Americans to respect U.S. foreign investments and to follow the U.S. lead on the global stage in exchange for the nonintervention pledge. During World War II, the United States confronted Argentina’s civilian and military leaders, especially Colonel Juan Perón, when Argentina did not adhere to U.S. policies toward the Axis powers (Woods 1979, 111-66). In sum, the Franklin Roosevelt administration practiced sphere of influence policies in the Western Hemisphere.

Security and stability, in the name of anticommunism, became the chief U.S. goals during the Cold War. U.S. policy makers believed that they needed a safe “backyard” in the Western Hemisphere so that they could give full attention to defeating the Soviet Union and communism in Europe and Asia. As early as 1950, U.S. diplomats were privately discussing whether the United States could adhere to the nonintervention pledge. George F. Kennan, the author of the containment doctrine, posed the problem in a lengthy memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Acheson on March 29, 1950. Kennan, who toured South American capitals, disdained Latin American civilization and culture, noting that there could be no “other region of the earth in which nature and human behavior could have combined to produce a more unhappy and hopeless background for the conduct of human life.” Ever the realist, Kennan also called for reminding Latin Americans that the United States was a great power and “that by and large much less in need of them than they are in need of us.” Nonetheless, the United States required Latin America’s strategic support in the Cold War. Allies and friends would lose confidence in the United States if it could not control its sphere of influence. Kennan further believed that the international Communist movement represented a clear and present danger to Latin America and that Latin Americans lacked the vigor and efficacy to resist Communist subversion. Kennan offered a grim policy prescription. To combat the Communist menace, the United States needed to understand “that harsh governmental measures of repression may be the only answer; that these measures may have to proceed from regimes whose origins and methods would not stand the American concepts of democratic procedures.” Dictatorships were “preferable alternatives, and indeed the only alternatives, to further communist successes.”<sup>2</sup>

Kennan’s report did not directly influence U.S. policy. U.S. Department of State officials kept the report locked in a safe for over twenty-five years, because they feared making public Kennan’s prejudicial comments (Trask 1978, 307). Nevertheless, U.S. officials followed Kennan’s advice, for they embraced anti-Communist dictators in the postwar period. During the 1950s, the Batistas, Trujillos, and Somozas of the region curried favor with the United States by loudly proclaiming that they were now fervent anti-Communists. In fact, the tyrants labeled all political opponents, including decent democrats, as “Communists.” The Dwight Eisenhower administration further bestowed medals and military support upon Latin American military dictators. In one notorious case, the administration awarded the Legion of Merit, the nation’s highest award for

2. Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, 29 March 1950, U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950*, vol. 2, *The United Nations; Western Hemisphere* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 598-624 (hereafter *FRUS*).

foreign personages, to Marcos Pérez Jiménez (1953-1958) of Venezuela. The award's announcement commended the military dictator for his "constant concern toward the problem of Communist infiltration." To be sure, the Eisenhower administration did not prefer dictators over democrats. As U.S. Ambassador to the OAS John Dreier recalled, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles would have been happy to see "flourishing little democracies" in Latin America. But Dreier added, "I think that he was somewhat inclined to feel that governments which contributed to stability in the area were preferable to those which introduced instability and social upheaval, which would lead to Communist penetration." Dulles, therefore, was "very tolerant" of dictatorships, "as long as they took a firm stand against communism" (Rabe 1988, 38-40).

Even as it bolstered anti-Communist regimes, the Eisenhower administration secretly discussed whether it could abide by the nonintervention pledge. Throughout the 1950s, President Eisenhower approved a series of confidential National Security Council (NSC) papers that called on the United States to take any "political, economic, or military actions deemed appropriate" if a Latin American nation established close ties with the Soviet Union. Eisenhower's advisors reasoned that Latin Americans were so wedded to the nonintervention principle that the United States could never hope for majority support for an OAS resolution sanctioning an intervention. They lamented that Latin Americans believed that "the United States overemphasized Communism as a threat to the Western Hemisphere," and therefore took "insufficient precautions against internal Communist subversion and in dealings with the Soviet bloc." The Eisenhower administration agonized that, if Latin American nations joined the rank of the neutrals or fell under Communist domination, the "ability of the United States to exercise effective leadership of the Free World" would be seriously impeded (Rabe 1985, 95-100).

The Eisenhower administration went beyond talking about "exceptions to non-intervention" and actually intervened in the Latin American nation of Guatemala. The administration used the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to carry out a destabilization campaign in 1953-54 against the popularly elected government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán (1950-1954). Officials persuaded themselves that President Arbenz was either a Communist, a friend of Communists, or oblivious to the Communist threat. Latin Americans did not share that perception of President Arbenz. At an inter-American conference held in Caracas, Venezuela in March 1954, the Latin American delegates readily condemned communism but declined to authorize any coercive measures aimed at Guatemala. Faced with Latin American intransigence, the administration took the actions it "deemed appropriate." The CIA sponsored a rebel army led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas that crossed Guatemala's borders in June 1954. The administration coupled its "invasion" of Guatemala with a massive campaign of political, military, and psychological pressure designed to compel the Guatemalan military to move against President Arbenz. Arbenz fled the country in late June, and the administration informed the Guatemalan military that Colonel Castillo Armas (1954-1957) would take charge of the country. This covert intervention preserved the fiction of the nonintervention pledge, albeit President Eisenhower readily admitted in his memoirs that he supplied U.S. planes to bomb Guatemala City (Immerman 1982, 133-97). The CIA intervention in Guatemala established the precedent for a series of covert interventions in the 1960s in

the Western Hemisphere: Cuba (1959-1963), British Guiana (1961-1964), and Brazil (1962-1964).

President John F. Kennedy and his team argued that the Eisenhower approach to Latin America had been counterproductive. Support for anti-Communist tyrants, such as Cuba's Batista, had forced desperate, oppressed Latin Americans into the arms of radicals such as Fidel Castro, who took control of Cuba in January 1959. The Kennedy administration preached the virtues of "enlightened anticommunism." The United States would support decent Latin American democrats, such as President Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela (1959-1964), and bolster them with a generous economic aid package, the Alliance for Progress. Through the transfer of \$20 billion in public and private capital, the administration envisioned transforming Latin America into a progressive, prosperous region that was resistant to communism. Although the Kennedy administration dreamed about doing noble work in Latin America, the administration dreaded its foreign-policy nightmares. In the words of presidential advisor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., President Kennedy had an "absolute determination" to prevent a second Cuba in the Western Hemisphere (Rabe 1999, 9-33). Indeed, the administration labored to destroy the Castro regime. President Kennedy authorized the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, albeit Kennedy decided at the last moment not to provide U.S. air cover to the invasion force of Cuban exiles. Thereafter, the administration conducted "Operation Mongoose," a \$40 million campaign of arson, sabotage, and terrorism carried out against the island by CIA agents and Cuban exiles. Operation Mongoose contributed to the onset of the Cuban missile crisis, the most ominous Soviet-American confrontation of the Cold War (Giglio and Rabe 2003, 29-45). In the aftermath of the missile crisis, President Kennedy publicly pledged not to invade the island. But he continued to authorize violent attacks against Castro and Cuba. Both in June and November 1963, Kennedy, using the cover of "higher authority," personally approved sabotage operations, such as blowing up power plants, against Cuba. The president and his brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, probably also were aware of the various CIA efforts between 1961 and 1963 to assassinate Fidel Castro (Rabe 2000, 714-26).

On November 18, 1963, in what would prove to be his last speech on inter-American affairs, the president pronounced the "Kennedy Doctrine." Kennedy made explicit the dictums that Eisenhower and his NSC had secretly approved. In May 1963, at the president's direction, a special NSC task force, working outside of normal channels, began preparing a declaration to be known as the Kennedy Doctrine. As National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy explained it, the president wanted "a declaration or doctrine which would put the Russians and Latin Americans on notice that the United States would not accept a second Castro in this hemisphere." The NSC task force's deliberations took place during a period when the administration was destabilizing the governments of President João Goulart of Brazil (1961-1964) and Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan of British Guiana (1957-1964) by having the CIA instigate a series of demonstrations, strikes, and riots in urban areas. In fact, Bundy opined that the easiest way to disclose the new policy would be in the context of a new crisis, such as British Guiana, in which "our decision to act would be generally approved." The task force realized, however, that OAS members would not welcome a public statement reiterating the U.S. right to exer-

cise international police power in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>3</sup> Latin Americans did not share the Kennedy administration's anxiety about subversion and "another Cuba."

President Kennedy decided, however, not to spare Latin American feelings. His assessment of regimes in Brazil, British Guiana, and elsewhere led him to defend the U.S. resolve to defeat communism in the hemisphere. In his November 18 speech to an audience in Miami, the president took up the issue of "international responsibility." Communism ceaselessly struggled for world domination and menaced the Alliance for Progress. The American states needed to confront the challenge by coming "to the aid of any government requesting aid to prevent a takeover aligned to the policies of foreign communism." Kennedy advised: "My own country is prepared to do this." "Every resource at our command" must be used "to prevent the establishment of another Cuba in this hemisphere" (Rabe 1999, 95-98). The Kennedy Doctrine attracted little public comment, for, as Bundy explained to Attorney General Kennedy, the president's declaration "was blanketed almost immediately by his death." Less than a month after the president's death, Bundy advised President Johnson to make a similar public statement, "taking a more vigorous line than we have in the past."<sup>4</sup> Johnson actually repeated President Kennedy's words about preventing a second Cuba in the hemisphere, when he delivered his Johnson Doctrine address in May 1965.

The Johnson Doctrine—steadfast U.S. opposition to communism in the Western Hemisphere—represented a continuation, not a departure, in postwar U.S. foreign policy. In fact, President Johnson continued Kennedy's wars against President Goulart and Prime Minister Jagan. In late March 1964, the Brazilian military, with U.S. encouragement and support, overthrew President Goulart and established a military dictatorship that would last more than two decades (Weis 1993, 141-69). President Johnson appreciated that the Brazilian generals backed his intervention in the Dominican Republic. Johnson also upheld Kennedy's demand that the United Kingdom devise an electoral scheme that would deprive Cheddi Jagan and his Indo-Guyanese supporters of political power. In December 1964, Forbes Burnham, who represented Afro-Guyanese, took control of British Guiana. Burnham had repeatedly assured U.S. officials that he would follow U.S. Cold War policies. The CIA intervened massively on behalf of Burnham in both the 1964 and 1968 elections. Burnham and his party instituted a dictatorship in independent Guyana that would last until 1992. Burnham and his henchmen also relentlessly persecuted Guyana's Indians, who constituted the majority of Guyana's population (Rabe 2005, 139-73).

The U.S. military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 flowed from the concerns that had prompted the covert interventions in Guatemala, Brazil, and British Guiana. U.S. leaders concluded that a popular movement might be infiltrated by

3. Bundy to President Kennedy, 25 May 1963, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 12, *American Republics*, 348-49; Summary Record of the 10th Meeting of the Standing Group of the NSC, 16 July 1963, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 11, *Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath*, 850-53; Gordon Chase of NSC to Bundy on Kennedy Doctrine, 6 June 1963, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 12, pp. 350-51.

4. Bundy to Robert Kennedy, 21 February 1964, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 12, p. 351, n. 3; memorandum of meeting between president and U.S. national security officials, on Cuban issues, 19 December 1963, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. 11, pp. 904-9.



Communists and that the leader of the movement was complicit with the Communists or indifferent to their influence. As in the cases of Guatemala, Brazil, and British Guiana, U.S. officials lacked hard, reliable evidence to sustain fears about Communist infiltration. In early 1965, Dominicans had risen in rebellion against their authoritarian government, demanding the restoration of the presidency of Juan Bosch. Bosch, who had taken office in early 1963, had been the country's first popularly elected leader in more than three decades. Dominicans had suffered appalling abuses under the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo (1930-1961). Bosch alienated the traditional privileged sectors of Dominican society—propertied elites, the military, and the Roman Catholic Church—when he tried to address the needs of common people. In September 1963, the Dominican military overthrew Bosch, alleging that he was a “Communist.” The Kennedy administration had welcomed Bosch's election and provided him with substantial economic assistance. But it did not strongly object to his overthrow. Bosch had disappointed U.S. officials, because he had declined, on civil liberties grounds, to outlaw the Dominican Communist party. The Johnson administration thought that Donald Reid Cabral, Bosch's oligarchic successor, would give the Dominican Republic the order and stability it needed (Lowenthal 1972, 1-61; Rabe 1999, 34-48).

In a critical meeting on April 30, 1965, as revealed in the handwritten notes of presidential aide Jack Valenti, President Johnson bluntly told his subordinates why he was going to violate both the nonintervention pledge of President Roosevelt and the OAS Charter. Johnson declared:

I am not willing to let this island go to Castro. OAS is a phantom—they are taking a siesta while this is on fire. How can we send troops 10,000 miles away and let Castro take over right under our nose. Let's just analyze—we have resisted Communists all over the world: Vietnam, Lebanon, Greece. What are we doing under our doorstep. We know the rebel leaders are Communist, and we are sitting here waiting on the OAS. We know Castro will hate us. We got rid of the dictator and we will now get a real dictator.<sup>5</sup>

Johnson's outburst encapsulated the U.S. approach toward Latin America in the Cold War and throughout the twentieth century. The United States would not tolerate alien influences in the Western Hemisphere. Latin Americans could not always be trusted to preserve regional security. And the global credibility of the United States depended upon preserving order and stability in the U.S. sphere of influence. Disorder in the Dominican Republic had prompted Theodore Roosevelt to pronounce his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Sixty-one years later, Johnson was again exercising “international police power.”

The U.S. military intervention brought a modicum of stability to the Dominican Republic but hardly forestalled a Communist takeover. Johnson and his aides had grossly miscalculated the role of Dominican Communists in the pro-Bosch movement. Indeed, U.S. officials could never provide an accurate list of alleged Dominican Communists (Glejises 1978, 203-17). During the year of intervention, U.S. officials chose and then

5. Valenti's notes of meeting in White House Cabinet Room, 30 April 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 32, *Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana*, 100-02.

rejected seven different Dominican leaders, finally settling on Joaquín Balaguer, a protégé of Trujillo. Balaguer won the presidency in a U.S.-supervised election on June 1, 1966, defeating Bosch, who declined to campaign actively because of fears for his safety. The administration carefully monitored the election and ordered the CIA to finance Balaguer's campaign. As Richard Helms, the acting director of the CIA, recorded, President Johnson repeatedly informed him that he expected the CIA "to devote the necessary personnel and the material resources in the Dominican Republic required to win the presidential election for the candidate favored by the United States Government."<sup>6</sup> Balaguer dominated Dominican political life for the next three decades. U.S. officials could count on President Balaguer to support U.S. foreign-policy initiatives. Balaguer fulfilled President Johnson's prediction and wish. According to Valenti, Johnson predicted on April 30, 1965 that "we will have one of 3 dictators: 1) U.S., 2) Moderate dictator, 3) Castro dictator."<sup>7</sup> Balaguer became the desired "moderate dictator."

Neither Richard Nixon nor Ronald Reagan cited the Johnson Doctrine when they authorized interventions in Latin America. Nixon destabilized the government of Salvador Allende of Chile (1970-1973) and Reagan waged a mercenary war in the 1980s against the Sandinistas of Nicaragua. Both presidents acted because they accepted the basic foreign-policy premises about Latin America outlined by Secretary of State Olney in 1895, President Roosevelt in 1904, and George Kennan in 1950. In the case of Chile, President Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, ordered the CIA to prevent first the election and then the assumption to power of Salvador Allende (1970-1973), the Marxist leader of Chile. Both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had previously funneled copious amounts of money into Chile to defeat Allende. Indeed, CIA Director Helm's orders from Nixon in 1970 were as explicit as those he received from Johnson in 1965-66. Helms told aides that "President Nixon has decided that an Allende regime in Chile was not acceptable to the United States." Nixon promised \$10 million and "more if necessary" for the anti-Allende campaign.<sup>8</sup> When the Nixon administration's various gambits failed to prevent Allende's constitutional assumption of the Chilean presidency, Nixon and Kissinger employed diplomatic and financial tools and covert measures to generate political and economic chaos in Chile. Beyond worrying about Chile establishing close ties with the Soviet Union and Castro's Cuba, Nixon and Kissinger deemed it necessary to demonstrate that the United States would not allow, in the traditional U.S. sphere of influence, the peaceful accession to power of a Marxist regime. The destabilization of the Allende regime would serve as a signal to Western European Communists that they would not be permitted to win elections and wield power in countries such as Italy (Fagen 1975, 297-313).

6. Memorandum from Helms to Deputy Director for Plans of the CIA, Desmond Fitzgerald, 29 December 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 32, p. 358.

7. Valenti's notes of meeting in White House Cabinet Room, 30 April 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. 32, pp. 100-102.

8. U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 1-62; Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability* (New York: New Press, 2003), 1-2, 36.

With the Cold War over and the international Communist movement virtually moribund, the Johnson Doctrine would seem to no longer have any practical application. But the United States continues to practice the patterns of the past toward Latin America. For examples, President George H. W. Bush dispatched U.S. forces to Panama in late 1989 to overthrow Manuel Antonio Noriega, and his son, George W. Bush, quietly encouraged the overthrow of President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela in 2002. National security concerns—the Panama Canal, access to Venezuelan oil—undoubtedly motivated the interventions. But Noriega, the Panamanian strongman, and President Chávez incurred U.S. wrath primarily because they challenged U.S. leadership in the hemisphere. Through most of the 1980s, U.S. officials overlooked Noriega's authoritarianism, drug dealing, and perverted personal behavior because he assisted U.S. policies against the Sandinistas. Noriega met with then-Vice President George Bush and reportedly received CIA funds. In the post-Cold War period, Noriega failed to accommodate himself to the heightened U.S. concern about the international narcotics trade and desire for constitutionalism in Latin America (LaFeber 1989, 193-215). President Chávez infuriated U.S. officials with his public proclamations that U.S. international policies had retarded Latin America's socioeconomic development (Marquis 2002, A1, A8).

In sum, the Johnson Doctrine of 1965 should not be interpreted as a critical initiative in the history of inter-American relations. The Johnson Doctrine should instead be seen as part of the historic desire of the United States to preserve its hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.

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