

Lecture 3: April 6

*Credible Commitment – Costly, believable signal

* International power is relative power – relative to adversaries and allies

A. Europe – 1914 rankings


Germany = 4

Great Britain and France = 3

Russia = 2

Austro-Hungary = 1

B.



- I. Fighting the Cold War – 1945- 1992 The Balance of power at credible commitment
 - A. 1945 – The problem – Balancing to block Soviet expansion (the Polish example)
 1. The obvious alliance – Britain, France, Germany – impossible owing to Germany’s defeat in WWII.
 2. The alternative and actual alliance- Britain, France, US (NATO)
 - B. The American Commitment
 1. Small but significant conventional forces (to Europe)
 2. Strategic nuclear shield (Global)
 3. Economic aid (Marshall Plan)
 4. U.S. accepts despite fierce domestic opposition (both parties)
 5. Regular substantial military spending and a mass army (unprecedented levels!)
 - C. Eisenhower’s fear – “the military-industrial complex” (President 1952-60)
 1. WWII style mass mobilization would corrupt American civilization through excessive centralization, taxation, regulation and the subordinate of the individual to a security state (not just a fear of group power).
 - D. Eisenhower’s solution –
 1. Military strategy- massive retaliation (origins of Triad)
 2. Reduction of federal spending and promotion of market-led growth
 3. Goal – deterrence of Soviet/Chinese aggression through a credible commitment to massive counter-strikes and the prevention of the development of a permanent security state.
 - a. Promotion of world stability through signaling of credible commitment to protect key allies and the use of trade to create global prosperity.
 - b. Example- the B-52 and the hydrogen bomb; tariff cuts
 - c. Credible commitment to Europe (The NATO tripwire).

- II. The Soviet Dilemma – the window of strategic inferiority 1948-1970s – Balancing
 - A. During this period, the USSR was at a substantial nuclear disadvantage on land, sea, and air.
 - 1. Possibility – US first strike
 - B. Soviet Deterrence
 - 1. Credible commitment – massive conventional forces capable of overrunning Europe
 - 2. Bluffing-claims of nuclear superiority, space technology advantage
 - 3. Support of the Third World; “revolutions” like Vietnam often fails
 - 4. Negotiation over issues like testing of bombs, use of space.

- III. Kennedy, the Missile Gap, and the Cuban Missile Crisis
 - A. 1960 Kennedy campaigns against Nixon; claims US has a real strategic *disadvantage* relative to the USSR. Nixon cannot fully counter without violating national security
 - B. Kennedy wins—dramatically increases nuclear and conventional defense spending (“We will bear any burden, pay any price...”)
 - 1. Intervention on Third World (US in Vietnam)
 - C. Was Kennedy bluffing? Did he plan to win the Cold War?

- IV. The Soviet Calculation
 - A. Given that US has a nuclear advantage, why would Kennedy signal weakness and credibly commit to Arms Race?
 - 1. The possibility of a first strike nuclear capability
 - 2. The neutralization of the Soviet conventional advantage
 - 3. The shifting balance of power
 - 4. Soviet responsive – missiles to Cuba (1962); the Cuban Missile Crisis

- V. Section I- IV and the balance of power
 - A. Everything discussed from 1948 to 1962 can be understood as shifts in a dynamic balance of power that operated
 - 1. Regionally (primarily in Europe)
 - 2. Globally (strategic nuclear balance)

- VI. 1968-1992 The Global Balance
 - A. This period was characterized as stable, but dynamic global balance of power constantly undermined by a long-term nuclear arms race (the Ohio Class Submarine)
 - B. Man on the Moon- 1969
 - 1. 1969 one spillover of the arms race was the moon race
 - 2. The absence of Soviets
 - C. Federal Funding of science and technology