Perceived failures of post-war Keynesian fiscal policy led to an extensive reinterpretation of the Great Depression as a monetary phenomenon,
I need a critical review on chapter 2 and 3 on The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession by Richard Koo
Pick one of two
Q1: Perceived failures of post-war Keynesian fiscal policy led to an extensive reinterpretation of the Great Depression as a monetary phenomenon, starting with Friedman and Schwartz (1963). What is Koo’s more nuanced criticism of post-war Keynesian fiscal policy? And how does the “current academic consensus” about the Depression factor into Koo’s criticism of the academic consensus on Japan’s lost decades? or Q2: What is the crux of Koo’s argument that the Great Depression was also a balance sheet recession? Relatedly, how is Koo critical of the Romer and Temin “consensus view” regarding U.S. recovery? Do you find Koo’s argument convincing?
Answer preview for Perceived failures of post-war Keynesian fiscal policy led to an extensive reinterpretation of the Great Depression as a monetary phenomenon,
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